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COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

UNSEX CEDAW, OR WHAT'S
WRONG WITH WOMEN'S RIGHTS
DARREN ROSENBLUM*
PROLOGUE
Before I go on, I want to tell a story. During high school, I
had an English teacher who often wore a pendant from the
National Organization of Women. I asked her about it and we

began a conversation that continued for years as she fed my
voracious mind with Gloria Steinem, Alice Walker and other
feminist literature. One day, on my way home from a meeting of
Gay and Lesbian Youth of New York, I picked up the Village
Voice and saw an announcement for a women's rights
conference. My dad drove me into the city for the conference,
which well over a thousand people attended. As part of the
forum, individuals reported back from the 1985 World
Conference on Women held in Nairobi. As people entered the
hall, a slide show of conference photos ran alongside Helen
Reddy's "I am Woman."1 Perhaps two or three men were there.
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. For all citation,
reference or distribution, contact rosenblum@law.pace.edu. The Author's
webpage is accessible at http://www.pace.edu/page.cfmn?doc-id=23191. Deepest
thanks to Afra Afrasharipour, Jose E.Alvarez, Bridget J. Crawford, Mary Anne
Case, Peter Danchin, Adrienne D. Davis, Elizabeth F. Emens, Karen Engle,
Katherine M. Franke, Berta Esperanza Hern~ndez-Truyol, Holning S. Lau,
Thomas M. McDonnell, Melissa E. Murray, Daria Roithmayr, Laura Rosenbury,
Cora True-Frost, Ralph Wilde and Angela Onwuachi-Willig. Special thanks to
Janet Halley, whose fearless writing has inspired me and whose constant
encouragement has made this Article a reality. My deepest thanks to the many
amazing comments received in presenting versions of this work at the American
Association of Law Schools, the Columbia University Human Rights Seminar,
Harvard Law School, Hofstra Law School, LatCrit, the Association for the Study
of Law, Culture and the Humanities, University of California, Los Angeles
School of Law Williams Institute, University of Southern California School of
Law, University of Toronto Law School and Whittier Law School. Thanks to
Matthew Collibee as well as Hilary Atkin, Christa D'Angelica, Paul Humphreys,
Sen Liang, Michael Stevens, Nicholas Tapert and Adam Weiss.
1 HELEN REDDY, IAm Woman, on IAM WOMAN (Capitol Records 1972).
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Throughout the day, attendees approached me to inquire where
they could find coffee or if I was in the right place. As a sixteenyear old boy with darker-than-average skin, I must have struck
the attendees as some sort of coffee bo'. Why else would I be
there?
While I took no offense, this experience exposes the longstanding separatist tendencies of many women's rights efforts.
Even recently, Gloria Steinem spoke at a conference at the
University of Baltimore, saluting the women who have taken
inspiration from her. 2 Although I may have thought that such
assertions included the woman inside of me, and although I do
not think Steinem meant to slight men, her statement was not
only exclusionary, but also self-defeating. As a child and as an
adult, I struggled with gender. I continue to explore gender,
sexuality and the law in their many interactions. Yet, I hesitate to
make the argument that women's rights are too narrow a focus
for issues of gender equality and balance. Some may dismiss the
argument because I am a man. Worse, feminists may think I
belong to some reactionary men's movement and that I do not
"get" the struggle at some core level. This troubles me because,
in many ways I am just a big girl, and always have been. For this
reason, this Article is not a purely academic exercise for memy goal is to aid in the fight against gender inequality.
INTRODUCTION
CEDAW, 3 signed on July 17, 1980 by sixty-four countries,
has as its principal goals the protection and promotion of
women's rights and the elimination of discrimination against
women. 4 As of March 7, 2011, 186 countries-more than ninetypercent of the United Nations' member states-are parties to the

2 Videotape: Gloria Steinem Keynote Address (Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of
Law 2008), available at http://law.ubalt.cdu/template.cfm?pagc=928.

3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. I, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/180,
at pmbl. [hereinafter CEDAW].
4 See Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15,
1995, Progress in Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1

11-12,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/7 (June 21, 1995) [hereinafter Beijing Conference].
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Convention. 5 The most notable non-party to the Convention is
the United States.6 In addition, as of May 15, 2010, there are
seventy-nine Signatories and ninety-nine Parties to the Optional
Protocol, a supplement to CEDAW designed to remedy some of
the treaty's shortcomings. 7 Although challenges have hobbled
implementation of CEDAW, it remains the central
pillar of
8
gender equality norms at the international level.
The Convention, despite its focus on women's rights, is
also the preeminent treaty on gender inequality. It cannot
succeed, however, in creating gender equality if it continues to
focus so narrowly and exclusively on women. As Lady Macbeth
gathers the strength to achieve her evil ends, she implores the
spirits to "unsex me here." 9 She believes that her feminine
gender obstructs the ability to commit evil. Only by "unsexing"
herself will she be empowered to kill King Duncan. Viewing
"unsexing" as part of Lady Macbeth's evil reinforces the
objectionable set of ideas I seek to criticize. Although Lady
MacBeth's "unsexing" is normatively opposite of what I seek
here, CEDAW must also be "unsexed" to realize its potency.
It is amazing then to note that while CEDAW defines many
central terms, at no point does it attempt to define its central
subject, "women." At the time of CEDAW's adoption, the
5See CEDAW, supra note 3.
6Id.

7 Id. See also Press Release, Optional Protocol to Women's Convention
Comes into Force, U.N. Doc. WOM/1242 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ protocol/wom1242.htm (noting that the
Optional Protocol "provides an international remedy for violations of women's
rights.").
8

See generally Darren Rosenblum, hIternalizing Gender: Why

InternationalLaw Theoty Should Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 759 (2007) [hereinafter InternalizingGender].
) As Lady Macbeth prepares to murder Duncan, she says: "The raven
himself is hoarse/That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan/Under my
battlements. Come, you spirits/That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here/And
fill me from the crown to the toe top-full/Of direst cruelty. Make thick my
blood." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act I, Sc. 5. Many thanks to Bridget
Crawford for alerting me to this passage's relevance to my critique of CEDAW.
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complexity of sex and gender was only recognized in a few
contexts. CEDAW's focus on "women" enshrines the male/
female binary in the core of international law' when CEDAW's
goals would be better served by seeking the elimination of the
categories themselves. While more recent international law
efforts have shifted toward a focus on gender and sexuality, 10 the
Convention remains bound to "women's rights."
Strikingly, legal scholars have not directly targeted the
centrality of the term "women" in CEDAW. Although it is
beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue the oeuvre of
feminist international law theory, any discussion of CEDAW
must address the foundational book by Hilary Charlesworth and
Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of InternationalLaw. I This
book addresses every relevant area of international law from a
feminist perspective.' 2 In doing so, Charlesworth and Chinkin
demonstrate that international law has excluded women's
concerns in many areas, including human rights and interstate
relations. 13 Their conclusion is that international law should
recognize these feminist issues generally and that feminists
10Many institutions, such as Columbia University, Harvard University,
Yale University, and othcrs, have programs that focus not only on women, but on
gender and sexuality more broadly. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY INST. FOR RESEARCH
ON WOMEN & GENDER, http://www.columbia.cdu/cu/irwag/indcx.html (last
visited June 19, 2011); YALE UNIV. WOMEN'S, GENDER, & SEXUALITY STUDS,

http://www.yale.edu/wgss/ (last visited June 19, 2011); WOMEN, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY @ HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://wgs.fas.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do (last

visited June 19, 2011 ).
11 HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000) (discussing, among other
things, prominent feminist theories in international law, modes of international

law-making, the law of treaties, the idea of the state, international institutions,
human rights, the use of force in international law and peaceful settlements in
dispute).
12See id.

13See id. at 218-40 (discussing the inadequacies of human rights law for
women). The authors point out that, with the exception of the Children's
Convention and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, "all the 'general' human
rights instruments use only the masculine pronoun." Id. at 232. This vocabulary,
it is argued, reinforces the hierarchies based on sex, gender, and sexual
orientation. Id.
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should "use existing mechanisms' 4 and principles wherever
possible to improve women's lives.'
Many other scholars, notably Karen Engle, 15

Dianne

Otto, 16 Janet Halley 17 and Lara Stemple, have been critical of

various aspects of international women's human rights law. In
particular, Halley has criticized feminist-influenced international
law as "Governance Feminism," the engagement of feminist
efforts in the governance of a wide variety of regulatory forms,
from states to quasi-state institutions. 18 This anti-identitarian
impulse is correct insofar as strict adherence to identity may lead
to unintended consequences.
David Kennedy presents a much less sanguine vision of
international human rights law (IHRL) than Charlesworth and
Chinkin in The Dark Sides of Virtue. Although Kennedy admits
that IHRL has undeniably accomplished many positive things,
14 Id.

at 336.

15 See generally Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private
Distinction: Strategizing Women s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) [hereinafter
After the Collapse];Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)contents:Criminalizing
Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 778. (2005)
[hereinafter Feminism and Its Discontents].
16 See generally Dianne Otto, Disconcerting "Masculinities':Reinventing
the GenderedSubject(s) of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 105 (Doris Buss & Abreena Manji eds.,
2005): .

17 See generally JANET

HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO

(2006) [hereinafter SPLIT DECISIONS]. Janet
Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the
International Law of Armed Conflict," 9 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 78 (2008)
[hereinafter Rape in Berlin];Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions
in the Criminalizationof Sex-Related Violence in Positive InternationalCriminal
Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Rape at Rome]. •
TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM

IS See Rape in Berlin, supra note 17, at 79. Janet Halley, in her work on
international criminal law, criticized "governance feminism" for its push to
eliminate consent as a defense to genocidal rape. Id. at 78. According to Halley,
governance feminists rely on an excessive criminalization of sexuality in which
some contact may be consensual. Id. This example demonstrates how
governance feminism's havoc falls on men, which has led Halley to "take a
break from feminism." SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 33.
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he alleges that it is riddled with hidden risks, costs, and
unintended consequences. t 9 This critique could easily apply to
CEDAW. For example, Kennedy argues that efforts to attract the
widest number of signatories to a treaty result in watered down,
vague standards. These treaties do little to attack the causes of
inequalities and divert attention away from a resolution of the
problem. 20 In short, Kennedy does not view IHRL as a fruitful
path toward resolving human rights problems, a critique which
inherently includes CEDAW.
My goal is to strive for a middle ground between
Charlesworth and Chinkin on the one hand, and Kennedy on the
other, that encompasses use of the sharpest critical tools without
dismissing CEDAW's aspirations. It is possible that CEDAW, as
Kennedy would argue, not only fails to meet its drafters' goals,
but also that it actually does more harm than good. To me,
however, the Convention appears to foster connections among
networks of nongovernmental activists, which lends strength to
some gender equality efforts. Although I am not an outright
positivist who believes in a direct causal link between legal
goals and social norms, sometimes law may foster progress.
With regard to the project Charlesworth and Chinkin
established, my goal here is not to argue against them or the
feminist internationalism that their book represents. They take
on women as their clients, with their singular goal the
representation of women both as bystanders to interstate activity

19 DAVID

KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE

3-35 (2004). For

example, another crucial point of Kennedy's, one made in a different vein by
Janet Halley's work, is the argument that IHRL establishes an all-encompassing
discourse in which all actors become either the "victim," "violator," or
"bystander." Id. at 14-15.
20 Id. at 24-25. Take, for example, a state signing up for a norm against
discrimination. This action takes the place of actually ending the problem. Id. at
25. In this regard, human rights treaties arc similar to warfare treaties that
actually legitimize violence rather than prevent it through vague standards and
lax enforcement. Id. at 25. Vague standards, in an effort to sign on the largest
number of countries, can actually validate injustice as states interpret and utilize
a treaty in varying degrees. CEDAW follows this model to some extent.
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and as outsiders to rights protections. 21 This Article does not
disagree with the descriptive assessment of women's place in
international law, and my interpretation of CEDAW's
shortcomings does not cut against their understanding of the
import of "improving women's lives. '2 2 The disagreement is
with the reason behind this inequity. Women face subjugation by
the power relationship that establishes men as superior but more
significantly from the division of humanity into two groups, one
of which necessarily sits on top. Focusing only on "improving
women's lives" serves to reinforce the very binary that must be
dismantled to achieve change. This does not mean that women's
lives do not merit improving-my problem is with the central
and exclusive framing of the issue in this light. "Women's lives"
cannot be improved until being a "woman" or a "man," or for
that matter one of the many other sexes that exist, means less in
terms of social, legal and political standing. This is the challenge
posed to women-centered feminism by transgender movements
(in the United States and elsewhere) and by Scandinavian
feminism (which expressly seeks the reduction of gender
differences). It is a challenge that has led to the Yogyakarta
Principles, 2 3 a non-binding agreement of international law
experts who specialize in sexuality and gender-related rights.
Here this Article attempts to turn that critique back on

21

See

CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN,

supra note II, at I (describing their

attempt to give expression to women, a category which has "been thoroughly
obscured by and within the international legal ordcr").
22 Id. at

336.

23 Conference of International Legal Scholars, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
Nov. 6-9, 2006, Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Mar. 2007),
available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principlcs-en.pdf [hereinafter
Yogyakarta Principles].
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CEDAW. This study centers on a textual analysis of CEDAW, 24
and its goal is not to destroy or even undermine the Convention.
Rather, this Article aims to force those of us who take sex and
gender and even women's rights seriously to see the treaty for
what it is: a sometimes useful tool of international law that's
emphasis on "women" reinforces the sex binary. All this Article
seeks is an admission of CEDAW's limitations.
Part I discusses why CEDAW continues to be relevant as
the primary source of international law on sex discrimination.
Until the advent of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), CEDAW was the most widely-subscribed international
treaty. Some of the draft language of CEDAW reflects the
tension between category and identity and how "women" won
the debate. Part 11 contrasts CEDAW with the Convention for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) .25 It points to the
identitarian focus of CEDAW as a core reason for its failures.
Had CEDAW reflected a category focus, as CERD did, it would
26
more directly incorporate the breadth of sex discrimination.
Part Ill argues that CEDAW should include all sexesCEDAW's focus on women excludes men, women who are not
victims and all other sexes. The Article concludes by arguing
that the counterproductive engagements by CEDAW suggest the
need for a radical refashioning of this crucial treaty.
Several consequences may follow. While my intention is
24

It is important to note that this Article focuses on the text rather than

examining the CEDAW Committee's work or interpretations among signatories.
That extensive material holds much fruit for further analysis of CEDAW's
questionable reliance on identity, including historical work on the drafting and
formation of the Convention as well as empirical work on the functioning of the
CEDAW Committee over the past three decades. See e.g., Oona A. Hathaway,
Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, IIl YALE L.J. 1935, 2006-10

(2002); Engle, supra note 15; Otto, supra note 16.
25 International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination, G,A, Res. 2106, (Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafler CERD].
26 See CEDAW, supra note 3 ("Any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.").
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not to disown responsibility for finding solutions, detailing their
tenor and shape would involve far more vision than this Article
What is clear to me is that to move sex
can accommodate.
equality into international law's mainstream, CEDAW must
27
incorporate this anti-essentialist and anti-identitarian critique.
At this point, three potential repairs arise, each of which requires
broad interstate political will that likely does not exist. CEDAW
may require amendment to incorporate broader definitions or a
Protocol to respond to its shortcomings. Such a Protocol could
draw extensively on the Yogyakarta Principles. At the very least,
recognition of the limitations of CEDAW's language could spur
reinterpretation of the Convention to reflect nonbinaristic
understandings of sex. To the extent that CEDAW is a living
document, its implementation depends on actors in States'
Parties-including governmental and non-governmental actors
(mostly women)-working in transnational activist networks.
These networks have the power to rethink CEDAW.
In concluding that CEDAW should be more inclusive, this
Article does not intend to exclude the need for remedies that
focus on the inequality that women face based on their identity;
rather, it argues that the principal treaty on sex discrimination
should not solely focus on this group. It is easy to construct the
need for a protocol, even a treaty, such as CEDAW, but it must
be part of a broader recognition of the complexity of sex
discrimination and not the sole treaty featured on the
international landscape.
1.

The Errant Centrality of "Women"

The meaning of "women" holds a clear appeal-its
universality and biologically-driven clarity make it the
apparently optimal focus for an international treaty reaching
toward legitimacy in a wide range of cultures. However,
CEDAW's drafters erred in placing "women" at the center of the
Convention. This Part first describes CEDAW's continued
27Anti-essentialism focuses on presumptions of meaning based on identity
-it is a descriptive project, or a counter-descriptivc project. Antiidentitiarianism by contrast focuses on legal and political consequences of
identity commitments. Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender
Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1119-27 (2006) [hereinafter Parity/Disparity].
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relevance as a central pillar of international gender equality law.
It then presents potential rationales for the presence of "women"
at the heart of CEDAW. Finally, although attempts have been
made to reformulate the use of the term "women" in a broader
fashion, notably by Catharine MacKinnon, this Part argues that
"women" as a term cannot reflect the full panoply of sex and
gender.
A. CEDAW's Continued Relevance
The drafters of CEDAW sought to situate women's rights
as a preeminent international concern. 28 Women throughout the
world confronted sexist institutions, and the drafters' goals
centered on utilizing international law to ameliorate these
harms. 29 CEDAW reflects the universalist goal of guaranteeing
rights but with the focus on women-a group that had
30
previously been excluded from much IHRL enforcement.
Despite the Convention's limited enforcement, one major
success of CEDAW is the extent to which some State Parties
31
have internalized its norms within their national legal systems.
Semi-formal and informal networks of women's rights advocates
can foster change in several national contexts with specific
connections to CEDAW's provisions. In these contexts,
CEDAW has served both to inspire action and as a source of

28 See Beijing Conference, supra note 4.
29

Id.

30The United Nations, for example, adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human iights in 1948. International Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22May 13, 1968, Declaration of Tehran, P 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/31 (May 13,
1968), reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights, A Compilation of
International Instruments 43-44 (1988). The Preamble proclaims that its member
states have pledged to promote "universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms." U.N. Charter pmbl., para. 6.
3'

See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:

Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638

(2004) (drawing on the meaning of the term "acculturation," the process through
which groups adopt the behaviors and beliefs of a surrounding culture. They
argue that this process can be "harnessed" by institutions in order to "socialize
recalcitrant states" into complying with international norms.).
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legitimization for national women's advocacy movements. 32 A
principal achievement of CEDAW is its attempt to bridge the
divide between the public and the private in international law. As
Charlesworth and Chinkin put it:
[CEDAW's] transcendence of the divide
between first and second generation rights
32 Internalizing Gender, supra note 8, at 785. (examining the utility of
comparative methodologies in analyzing the process by which nations internalize
international norms, specifically considering how quotas for women's
representation in France and Brazil illustrate the power of international legal
instruments in different State contexts). CEDAW, art. 7 requires parties
"to
eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the
country .. .In the early 1990s, Brazilian feminists drew on the international
women's ights movement to address that women accounted for only ten percent
of the country's representtion in government. See generally Clara Ara(ijo,
Quotas for Women in the Brazilian Legislative Svsten, Int'l IDEA Workshop:
The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American Experiences, Feb. 23-24, 2003,
available at http://www.quotaprojcct.org/CS/CSAraujo_
Brazil 25-11-2003.pdf. To elevate "the presence of women in political
institutions and party leadership," id. at 4, feminists forged ties with the leftist
opposition to the dictatorship. Id. at 4, tbls. 6 & 8. Their first victory came in
persuading the largest union, Central Unica dos Trabalhadores to adopt a
provision for a thirty percent minimum quota for women in its leadership, a
quota followed by other political parties. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Considerationof Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: Combined Initial, Second, Third, Fourth, and
Fifth PeriodicReports of States Parties:Brazil, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/BRA/I -5
(June 28, 2004) France failed to satisfy its obligations under Article 7 until it
passed the Parity Law of 2000. Loi 2000-493 du 7 juin 2000 de loi sur laparit6

[Law 2000493 of June 7 on the Parity Law],

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZEtTrE OF FRANCE], June 7, 2000, p.

8560. France's Parity Law imposes a fifty percent requirement with two kinds of
enforcement mechanisms, which vary depending on the election in question. Id.
In France, list-based elections determine municipal, regional, European and
certain senatorial elections. For these elections, the enforcement mechanism is of
the highest level: should a party fail to present candidates of alternating gender,
its list will not be registered by the Prefecture, and as a consequence it will not'
appear on the ballot. Thus, a political party must propose as many male and
female candidates, or lose the ability to run any candidate. La Gazette dc
L'AFEM [Association des Femmes de l'Europe Meridionalc] [Association of
Southern European Women], May-June 2000, at 3. Overall France's Parity Law
has proven more effective than Brazil's Quota Law-a difference that can be
attributed to the more powerful enforcement mechanisms. I argue that key
differences in implementation derive, in part, from the variation in the
construction of gender in these two different countries. Parity/Disparity,supra
note 27 at 1119-27.
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acknowledges that, for women, protection of
civil and political rights is meaningless
without attention to the economic, social, and
cultural context in which they operate. It
identifies areas where discrimination against
women is most marked and where women
most need guarantees of rights. The Women's
Convention also attempts to overcome the
public/private dichotomy
observed in
33
international law.

In this vein, CEDAW's main provisions appropriately define
discrimination against women as any:
[D]istinction, exclusion, or restriction made on
the basis of sex, which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women,
irrespective of marital status, on the basis of
equality between men and women, of human
rights or fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic,
social, cultural, civil, or any other
34
field.

States' Parties agree to pursue all necessary civil, political,
economic, social and cultural actions, including "temporary
special measures," to guarantee women's rights. 35 CEDAW
guarantees access to public decision-making bodies, but unlike
other human rights instruments it also supports women's
equality within the "private" family context. Specific provisions
span many areas of equality, including the recognition of the
social function of motherhood, 36 suppressing trafficking 37 and

33CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note II, at 217.
31CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. I.
35Id. arts. 2-4.
36

ld. art. 5.

31Id. art. 6.
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ensuring a woman's right to vote and hold public office. 38 The
Convention favors reducing stereotypes in order to establish
equal access to education, employment and health care, 39 to
share equal property rights, to increase women's ability to
choose marriage and childbearing freely and to share
responsibilities related to child rearing. 40 Other provisions
empower the Committee with regard to permissible reservations
countries 4' as well as hearing
and dispute-settlement between
42
progress.
their
countries report
CEDAW's norms inspire a range of reactions from
counties, including everything from fully compliant
internalization to disdainful evasion. 43 Countries do to some
extent internalize CEDAW's norms, as the Convention has
succeeded in certain contexts in legitimizing and

38Id. art. 7.

39 Id. arts. 10-14. Article 15 emphasizes the need to protect these rights
for rural women, an especially vulnerable group.
4 CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. 16.
41 Id. arts.
42

23-30.

Id. arts. 17-18.
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institutionalizing women's rights. 44 However, countries
internalize norms in different ways. In addition to states
proactively adopting international norms, international law can
encourage internalization through transnational networks of
activists and individuals, 45 as well as through acculturation and
selective adaptation. 46 Cultural differences surface within and
across national boundaries and state and non-state actors engage
in political behavior based on multiple rationalities. Some
international scholars may. worry that cultural relativism

44 Id. Only when States internalize international law do they establish
domestic legal obligations. Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2659 (1997). As Koh describes, "obligation to obey
an international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation
when that norm has been interpreted and internalized into [a state's] domestic
legal system." Id. Without internalization, CEDAW lacks substantial impact.
Along with Koh, other scholars have theorized as to how states internalize
international law. See e.g., Rex Glenscy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 79, 86-87 (2005) (describing how "[t]ransnational norm entrepreneurs"
facilitate internalization in both their home countries and abroad); Goodman &
Jinks, supra note 31, at 638. (explaining how institutions can harness
acculturation, the process in which individuals and groups adopt beliefs and
behaviors of a surrounding culture, to drive internalization); L. Amede Obiora,
Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and Comparative
Analyses, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 669 (1998) (suggesting that internalization can
only occur with 'local legitimation and support"). Internalization involves a
translation process in which the local actor interprets the application to her state.
See Pierre Lcgrand, Paradoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies,
27 CARDOzO L. REV. 631, 665, 705 (2005) (discussing KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed.
1998)); Jacques Derrida, Des Tours de Babel, in DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION
179 (Joseph F. Graham cd. & trans., 1985). Examples of CEDAW internalization
include Brazil and France. See Internalizing Gender, supra note 8, at 787. See
also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
45 See- MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-1 0 (1998).
46 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 31, at 638; Internalizing Gender,
supra note 8, at 824-25.
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challenges the viability of IHRL universal norms,4 7 but such
norms have found their way into domestic legal systems, often
colored with local cultural realities.48 Although these cultural
differences may distract observers from the influence of
international norms, internalization does occur.
Despite the opportunities associated with internalizing
norms, CEDAW's limitations have had profound implications
for its effectiveness. A principal limitation is the wealth of
substantial reservations that limit its applicability. 49 The many
reservations to CEDAW include those related to religious law,
often reflecting resistance to changing sexist cultural and

47 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, for example, may assert that this
relativism prevents universal international norms from affecting State behavior.
See JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I I-

12 (2005). See also Koh, supra note 44. They argue that some combination of
the four models of State relations (coincidence of interest, coordination,
cooperation, and coercion) can explain State behavior, rather than compliance.
For a discussion on the influence of cultural relativism, see CHARLESWORTH &
CHINKIN, supra note 1I, at 222-29. They note that some scholars reject cultural
relativism because it retards the development of universal standards. Id. at 22223 (citing F.Teson, hiternationalHuman Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA.
J. INT'L L. 869 (1985)).
4' See Internalizing Gender, supra note 8, at 759, 821-25. For example,
French and Brazilian internalization of international norms, like women's
suffrage, appear distinct. See id. Yet international law has still impacted both
countries domestic laws. Id at 788-799. Variances between countries may be the
result of different modes of internalization, including transnational networks of
activists and individuals, acculturation, and selective adaptation. Id. However,
this does not diminish the impact of internalization.
49States Parties attach reservations to particular provisions of treaties they
refuse to accept. CEDAW has attracted the most significant reservations of any
human rights treaty. See Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique
of CEDA Ws Reservation Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the
Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 605, 606 (2002). As of 2002,
fifty-five States had reservations to CEDAW, and another fourteen States had
ultimately withdrawn reservations they had initially filed. Id. at 606.
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religious norms. 50 Between and within nations, laws that affect

o For example, Saudi Arabia's reservation notes that "[i]n
case of
contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law,
the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the
Convention." United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations & Reservations to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Apr. 10, 2006) at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations.htm (last visited June 20, 201!) [hereinafter, United Nations Treaty
Collection, Declarations & Reservations] Saudi Arabia only recently began
debating whether to allow women to drive, yet it is a signatory to CEDAW. See
Linda M. Keller, The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Evolution and (non)Implementation Worldwide, 27 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 39, 41 (2004). See also Adia Gonzales Martinez, Human Rights of Women,
5 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 157, 175 (2001). Libya made a similar reservation
providing that CEDAW cannot conflict with Islamic laws having to do with
"personal status derived from the Islamic Shari'a." See Riddle, supra note 49, at
627. Countries like Egypt, Bangladesh, India, and Iraq have made comparable
reservations. See generally id. There is a debate over whether such broad
reservations arc legal under international law. Article 28 of the Convention,
permits ratification of the Convention with reservations, provided that they are
not "incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention." See
Laboni Amena Hoq, The Women s Convention and its Optional Protocol:
Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally Protected Rights, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 677, 688 (2001). The Convention, however, provides
no mechanism to determine whether a given reservation violates the terms of
Article 28. Significantly, many argue that without this reservation process,
CEDAW would have far fewer signatories. See e.g., id. By contrast, the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination contains more rigorous
procedures for the approval of party reservations. Article (20)2 of CERD
provides:
A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of
this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a
reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation
of any of the bodies established by the Convention be
allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or
inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this
Convention object to it.
CERD, supra note 25. The drafters of CEDAW contemplated restricting
reservations by subjecting them to the veto of member states, but chose a
permissive reservation scheme. Riddle, supra note 49, at 635 (citing Laura A.
Donner, Gender Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conventions: The
1979 'Women s Convention Compared with the 1965 Racial Convention, 24 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 241, 242 (1994)). In light of the large number of broadly termed
reservations under the women's convention, some argue that had the CEDAW
drafters included more stringent provision like those found in CERD, CEDAW
might have yielded more impressive results. Id.
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women vary substantially in ways that impact real lives.5 1
Depending on one's sex, nationality may determine when and
whom one can marry. It may also determine whether one can
divorce, control one's reproduction, own or inherit property and
even whether one can vote or run for office.5 2 Most CEDAW
States' Parties enforce straightforward rules on such questions,
often manifesting deep gender inequalities. 53 As such, CEDAW
provides a first step, but not a workable solution to inequality,
suggested by the fact that over forty-five countries around the
world-most of which have ratified or acceded to CEDAW54
maintain laws that explicitly discriminate against women.
Indeed, many aspects of CEDAW reflect a certain level of

SI InternalizingGender, supra note

8, at 825. For example, many large

countries' legal systems reflect substantial diversity whether by design through
federalism or by function.
52

53

5

ld.

ld.
See Kerry L. Ritz, Soft Enforcement: Inadequaciesof Optional Protocol

as a Remedy for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against* Women, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 191, 200

(2001).
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softness. 55 At its inception, CEDAW only provided two
procedures-the interstate procedure and the reporting
procedure-to monitor State Parties' compliance with the

5 Like many human rights endeavors, CEDAW has some soft law
characteristics such as failing to delegate power to the international institution.
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICs 37, 58 (Judith L. Goldstein
et al. eds., 2001). According to Abbot and Snidal, soft law:

[P]rovides a rational adaptation to uncertainty. It allows states
to capture the '"easy' gains they can recognize with
incomplete knowledge, without allowing differences or
uncertainties about the situation to impede completion of
the bargain . . . Soft law avoids the sovereignty costs

associated with centralized adjudication or other strong
delegation and is less costly than repeated renegotiation in
light of new information ...

; [it] allows states to adopt

their commitments to their particular situation rather than
trying to accommodate the divergent national
circumstances within a single text ... ; [it] accommodates
states with different degrees of readiness for legalization
[and] . . . ; facilitates compromise between weak and

powerful states.
Id. at 60. In contrast to soft law, the term hard law has been defined as "legally
binding obligations that are precise and that delegate authority for interpreting
and implementing the law." Id. Thus, CEDAW's softness may aid the cause of
attaining additional signatories as states do not actually cede enforcement power.
It also offers more effective ways to deal with uncertainties and "facilitates
compromise--mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different
interests and values, different time horizons and discount rates, and different
degrees of power." Id. at 38-39. Soft law is utilized when member States
recognize a given issue but are concerned about their sovereignty and the costs
and risks of entering an agreement. Id. at 50-51. Although CEDAW and the
Optional Protocol require State members to implement general guidelines to end
gender discrimination, they both set forth principles rather than rules, making
CEDAW a soft law. See Ritz, supra note 54, at 191, 214-15. CEDAW and the
Optional Protocol fail to provide precise legal obligations and do not require
compliance or responsibility by parties. See id. at 215.
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Convention, a significant limitation compared to other treaties.5 6
Article 29 of CEDAW, the interstate procedure, provides for a
resolution to conflicting interpretations and applications of the
Convention between State Parties. 57 However, no State has ever
engaged the interstate procedure, 58 likely because any State can
refuse to be held to it. 59 In response to these weaknesses,
international women's rights advocates pushed for the Optional
Protocol to the Women's Convention.60 The Protocol offers two
56See Hoq, supra note 50, at 684. Critics have argued that (prior to the
Optional Protocol) CEDAW lacked a complaint and communication process
designed to allow non-governmental organizations or individuals to bring
complaints against State Parties for violations of the Convention. Julia Ernst,
U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 337-40 (1995). By
contrast, CERD contains more rigorous enforcement provisions. CERD Article
14 authorizes the Committee to review complaints made by individuals alleging
to be victims of discrimination. Hoq, supra note 50.' CERD has another
enforcement advantage over CEDAW in its capacity to review complaints
submitted by one state party that charge another with violating the Convention.
Id. The CEDAW committee is limited to considering regular state reports and, as
such, is limited in the extent to which substantive treaty violations are brought to
its attention. Id.
11See Hoq, supra note 50 at 684.
58 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 305 (2006) [hereinafter ARE WOMEN HUMAN?].

'9 See Hoq, supra note 50, at 685. The interstate reporting procedure, set
forth in Article 18, obliges State Parties to submit an initial report within one
year of ratification of the Convention, followed by periodic reports at least once
every four years. Id. The reports must include the steps the State has taken to
integrate the Convention into domestic laws and policies and the difficulties the
State has faced in upholding the Convention. Id. These reports are submitted to
CEDAW, which examines the reports. Id. Article 17 gives specific authority to
CEDAW to review State Parties' reports and scrutinize their implementation and
adherence to the Convention before the international community, and, if needed,
CEDAW may issue general recommendations regarding the nature and extent of
State Parties' compliance. See id. See also Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a
Mechanism to Enforce Women s Right to State Protection frnm Domestic
Kiolence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 529 (1993). However,
CEDAW may not impose sanctions for noncompliance with the Convention or
engage in any form of arbitration between State Parties, or an individual and a
State Party, regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention. See
Ritz, supranote 54, at 204; Hoq, supra note 50, at 685.
60 See Hoq, supra note 50, at 683.
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new mechanisms: 1) the communications procedure, which
provides individuals and groups the right to lodge complaints
with CEDAW regarding States' violations of the Convention's
terms; and 2) the inquiry procedure, which enables CEDAW to
conduct inquiries into States' serious and systematic abuses of
women's human rights. 61 However, a State must still consent to
any visit from the CEDAW committee, 62 hampering the
Convention's efficacy.63 In addition, even if it were permitted to
investigate alleged violations, it could not force state
compliance. 64 Moreover, fewer than half of the member States
have ratified it. Ultimately, the Optional Protocol65 still falls short
of achieving full enforcement of the Convention.
In a previous article, I argued that CEDAW faces a
particularly challenging barrier in the translation of a universal
conception into different nations' sharply conflicting legal
cultures.66
Differentiation among legal cultures may lead to
divergent internalizations of the same international norm. 67 One
of CEDAW's weaknesses has been the underlying inability of
states to agree to specific, enforceable remedies for gender
inequality.68 In that article, I showed how the differences
between Brazilian and French gender constructions played out in

61See id. at 678; see also Riddle, supra note 49; Kcller, supra note 50, at
35.
62 See Kcller, supra note 50, at 38.
63Another argument for CEDAW's incffectivcness is its vague phrasing of
the goals parties to the Convention must accomplish to meet their affirmative
obligations. See Kathryn Christine Arnold, Note, Are the Perpetratorsof Honor
Killings Getting Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code
Analyzed Under the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1343, 1392-93 (2001).
64

See Ritz, supra note 54, at 191, 210-14.

65See Hoq, supra note 50, at 678; see also Ritz, supra note 54, at 208-09.
66hIternalizing Gender, supra note 8, at 807.
67 Id.
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remedies adopted pursuant to CEDAW. 6 9 There I argued that
cultural difference creates possibilities for new norms that do not
simply project one cultural frame onto the world political
stage.7 ° Here, I go one step further: the centrality of the
imprecise term "women" pretends to attain universality while
inhibiting cultural variation.
In short, efforts towards implementing CEDAW face
profound challenges, but CEDAW can and does influence
national behavior. Central to its cross-cultural appeal and its
profound limitations is the central subject of the treaty: women.
The choice of "women" over "sex" reflects a deliberate attempt
at universality in a legal instrument striving for legitimacy.
B. The Choice of "Women" over "Sex" and its Purpose
CEDAW's enactment attempted to ensure women a place
at the international law table, thereby serving the key second
wave feminist goal of recognizing women as proper subjects of
human rights. 71 Yet, this focqs also served broader legitimizing
purposes for the nascent international feminist movement. "Sex"
was the term used in the central document in human rights: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). But in 1946,
the march toward "women" began with the Commission on the
Status of Women (CSW), established as a commission of the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC). 72 Two decades later came the arrival of both the

69 See generally

id.

70 Id. at 801. Comparative techniques elucidate the potential for
integrating comparative and international legal scholarship. The comparative
scholar will examine the construction and culture of international law,
necessarily revealing its biases. Here, the political goals of CEDAW presume
sociopolitical structures of firmly rooted democracies. The terminology of "sex"
and "gender" ignores the potential for variation of gender across cultures. In
certain countries, gender means the divide between men and women, while in
others it may mean the fluidity of such identities, or even the ability to choose
sex or marital partners without regard to gender. Comparative work reveals such
cultural variations and their legal import. Id. at 807.

7' See Beijing Conference, supra note 4.
72ECOSOC Res. 2/1I, U.N. DOC. E/RES/2/I 1 (June 21, 1946).
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ICCPR 73 in 1966 and the Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (DEDAW) in 1967.74 The
ICCPR's language on this issue includes Article Two's reference
to "sex" as one of the protected categories (after "race" and
"colour") and Article Three's reference to ensuring "the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights set forth in the present Covenant." 75 By contrast,
DEDAW contains much of the language that was adopted by
CEDAW. The Convention's discussions reflected the weight of a
strong historical precedent in the prior use of "women."
CEDAW's drafters inherited a set of international institutional
engagements that reflected some tension over the use of
"women" (drawing on the Declaration) or "sex" (drawing on the
76
ICCPR).
In discussions held in 1974 before the Commission on the
Status of Women regarding the text of the potential Convention,
the force of the international history of "women" battled an
73 ICCPR, Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and in force on March 23, 1976. It is important to note that
human rights treaties overlap-the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides protections also guaranteed by several other treaties,
for instance. It is worth noting, then, that while CEDAW's emphasis on women
raises problems, it is one treaty among several in the area of human rights. States
that have signed multiple treaties must adhere to each; their multiple obligations
require states to attend not only to CEDAW's requirements on "women" but also
to ICCPR obligations related to "sex." My critique of CEDAW separates it from
these other treaties to understand the relationship between identity and
discrimination as CEDAW depicts it.
74Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Rcs. 22/2263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/22/2263 (Nov. 7, 1967).
75International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
arts. 2 & 3, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (Mar. 23, 1976).
76The analysis of the Travaux in this Article is at best an incomplete one.
Not all of the Travaux have been reviewed nor have any interviews of the
participants been conducted to clarify both how negotiations transpired and what
the parties intended by particular language. For that reason, at several points in
this historical discussion, I will use more tentative language to describe my
conclusions. It is also beyond the scope of this Article to detail the full history of
the use of the terms "women" and "sex" in international law prior to the advent
of CEDAW.
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interest in the "equality of men and women":
Different views were expressed as to the name
of the Commission on the Status of Women.
Although some argued that its name should
conform to that of the Promotion of Equality
of Men and Women Branch, others felt that the
question of a new name should be studied
carefully. Some representatives believed that
because the Commission had been known for
twenty-six years as the Commission on the
Status of Women, a change would only create
confusion and that what was really important
was the content of the program. It was
suggested also that the title of the Convention
of the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women should be changed to "Convention on
the Promotion
of Equality between Men and
7
Women." "
As this quote reflects, several states expressed an interest in
referencing equality between men and women. Such proposals
to adopt a Convention name that would expressly include men
ultimately failed.
Three years later, also during the course of CEDAW's
drafting, several countries took a different route, but one that
still sought to diverge from the focus on women. The countries
argued that the convention should "deal not only with
discrimination against women, but with discrimination on
grounds of sex as a whole. '7 8 The response to this suggestion
focused on the need for the Convention to address women's role
in society and at home, particularly with reference to maternity.
The United Kingdom proposed to resolve this debate with
11U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on theStatus of Women, Report
on the Twenty-Fifth Session,
1974).

267, U.N. Doc. E/5451 (Supp. No. 4) (Jan. 25,

78 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on theStatus of Women, Report
on the Twenty-Sixth and Resumed Twenty-Sixth Sessions, U.N. Doc. E/5909 E/
CN.6/608 (June 15, 1977).
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an attempt both to preserve the focus on women and to provide
those who supported the switch to "sex" with some inclusive
language. Their solution was to include men specifically in the
text of the Convention. Their proposal read:
For the purpose of the present Convention the term
"'discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference made on the basis of sex,
which has the effect of, or the purpose of, nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, on a basis of
equality with men, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of
public life.

79

Although the final language of the Convention varies
slightly from the United Kingdom's proposal, it reflects the same
language with regard to "women" and "men" and the absence of
"sex." To the drafters, such language perhaps seemed like a
fitting compromise to incorporate the concerns of those who
wanted a Convention on sex discrimination without abandoning
the centrality of women.
At least one other attempt to include references to "sex"
failed. In 1977, the United States proposed that the words "based
on sex" should replace the words "against women" in Article
2(e). 80 The final text reads instead: "[t]o take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any
person, organization or enterprise," omitting any reference to sex
or "equality with men."
It is not surprising then that the conclusion of these
discussions on including "sex" or even "men" yielded to the
centrality of "women." In 1977, the Commission on the Status of
Women determined, without a vote, "that the title of the
Convention should be similar to that of the Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women."8 1
79 d.

80 Id

81 G.A. Res., 62d Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/5909 E/CN.6/608
(1977).
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CEDAW reflected an historical need to focus on women
and their experiences in order to define and address the harms of
sexism. In the 1970s, women's rights activists asserted that
international law needed to define the harms of sexism. 82 The
Convention reflected an "up with women" 83 answer to crucial
international law questions. Political movements and academic
scholarship from the 1970s concentrated on promoting women's
empowerment-think "Sisterhood is Powerful. '84 At that time,
universalist notions of sisterhood overpowered even the hint of
gender's cultural contingency, which only began to shake the
core of transnational feminism with the 1990s controversies over
female genital cutting. 85 Now, in 2011, the role of the identity
"women" in this enterprise merits attention as the lack of
descriptive or critical analysis has become apparent.
82 Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third- Wave Feminist Legal Theory:
Young Women, Pornographyand the Praxis of Pleasure, 12 MIcH. J. GENDER &
L. 99, 101 (2007).
83

Id.

"4 ROBIN MORGAN, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL (1970). Proto-movcmcnt
transgenderism did not yet yield any women's movement introspection, as
tensions between lesbian feminists and drag queens tore apart the lesbian and
gay movement. This tension dates to early in the gay rights movement. During
the 1973 Pride March in Washington Square Park in New York City, radical
lesbian activist Jean O'Leary and the drag queens in attendance engaged in a
dispute, in part over whether the transvestites' overly feminine dress mocked
women. Only the. performance by Bette Midler of"You've Got to Have Friends"
soothed tensions. See STEPHAN L. COHEN, THE GAY LIBERATION YOUTH
MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK 169 (2008).
85 That controversy divided Western feminists, who decried the practice,

from other feminists, including African and Middle Eastern feminists, who
objected to the colonial tone of such reproaches. Western feminist efforts to
eradicate FGC may have led to nationalist responses in certain contexts. Whereas
the practice of FGC had been waning, once international actors entered national
contexts to oppose it, FGC became a newly valued part of tribal or national
tradition, a practice worth maintaining. See e.g., Hope Lewis, Between lrua and
"Female Genital Mutilation ": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the
Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. I (1995); Eugenic Anne Gifford, "The
Courage of Blaspheme ": Confronting Barriers to Resisting Female Genital
Mutilation, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.329 (1994); Leslyc Amede Obiora, Bridges
and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign
Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1997); Isabelle R.
Gunning, Uneasy Alliances and Solid Sisterhood: A Response to Professor
Obiora s Bridges and Barricades,47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1997).
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The Convention that was ultimately adopted, save for
Section 5(a), centers on "women." CEDAW's women-centered
approach initially served the goal of recognizing women as
proper subjects of human rights and that human rights norms
excluded many issues that affect women. However, while
CEDAW contains many definitions, at no point does it attempt
to define its central subject. 86 What "women" meant in the
1970's as CEDAW took shape can only be inferred given the
lack of definition of the term in the text of the Convention or
within the Travaux. 87 As with most silences, CEDAW's nondefinition of "women" reveals more than any definition that
CEDAW does contain. At the time of CEDAW's drafting, the

86 The Travaux do not reveal any debate over whether to define "women"
or what the term meant. See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1993).
87 The first wave of feminism was characterized by nineteenth century
advocacy for women's rights, primarily concerning attaining suffrage. Crawford,
supra note 82, at 101. The second wave of the 1960's and 70's sought more
political recognition of the rights and power of women as a group and was
signified by a rejection of traditional gender roles and femininity. -d. The second
wave was followed by the third wave in early 1990's. Id. at 107. "If first- and
second-wave feminism sought an accretion of rights and power to women as a
group, third-wave feminism seeks recognition for the individual. Id. at 117-18.
"To date, third-wave feminist writing has focused primarily on non-legal (and
non-theoretical) aspects of female sexuality, economic mobility and the multifaceted nature of racial, ethnic, class and gender identities. Third-wave feminist
writers also acknowledge and emphasize the role of culture, media and
technology in shaping those identities. These writers tend to take a broad view of
'women's issues' by connecting traditional feminist concerns such as
reproductive freedom and discrimination in employment with broader justice
movements for workers, immigrants, gays and lesbians and other disadvantaged
groups." Id. at 102.
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word "women" had not yet been interrogated. 88 The drafters
appear to have used the term uncritically, without contemplating
its effects on the Convention's utility.
Given CEDAW's lack of a definition for "women," a close
examination of its Preamble reveals some of the logic for this
89
focus.

The Preamble lists the bases in international law for the

establishment of the Convention. Central among them is the
guarantee in the UDHR that "everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind,
including distinction based on sex.' 90 Yet, the rights established
here are constructed around a protection from distinction based
on sex, a framing that does not reference one particular sex. This
reference to sex matches the non-identitarian references typical
of the Universal Declaration.

88The very silence conveys a presumption of universality with an obvious
meaning. By virtue of the seemingly harmless universalist and biological
meaning, the sotto voce definition of women involving submission and
subservience takes root. Perhaps CEDAW's failure to define women furthered
the goal of widespread ratification, but at the cost of reifying popular, and
implicitly sexist, understandings of "women." In 1976, the Concise Oxford
Dictionary defined a woman as: I) Adult human female; . . . 2) The average or
typical woman, the female sex, any woman ... 3) (colloq.) Charwoman; ... 4)
Man with feminine characteristics ... 5) The feminine emotions ... 6) attrib.
Female .... THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1341-42

(6th ed. 1976). Support for the fact that the term was uncontested at the time can
only be drawn from the absence of discussion over the meaning of the term. See
generally, REHOF, supra note 86 (referring to "women" and "men" without any
nuance or definition.).
89In setting out why the Convention is necessary, the Preamble notes that:
[D]iscrimination against women violates the principles of
equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an
obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms
with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural
life of their countries, hampers the growth of the
prosperity of society and the family and makes more
difficult the full development of the potentialities of
women in the service of their countries and of
humanity ....
CEDAW, supra note 3, at pmbl.
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From there, the paragraphs of the Preamble address "the
equality of rights of men and women," a principle established in
other international conventions and resolutions. This shift from
protecting against discrimination based on "sex" to ensuring the
"equality of rights of men and women," performs a crucial
move
from a universalist frame that could include different sexes to a
binary one that asserts both the existence of only two sexes and
the normative desirability of equality between them. Thus,
CEDAW departs from the universalist norm of "sex," which
from a 2011 perspective includes people of all sexes--"men,"
"women," transgender, intersex and other differently sexed
and
gendered people. By specifying "men" and "women," it began
the transition to identity-centeredness. The Preamble's last
statement of norms does reference both men and social roles:
"[a]ware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as
the role of women in society and in the family is needed to
achieve full equality between men and women." Despite this
language, the Preamble creates the basis for a Convention that
recognizes the male/female binary and places women at the
center of remedies for sex inequality. The balance of the
Convention references men only as an exception.
The Preamble achieves the establishment of both the sex
binary and the equality norm. The transition to the focus on
women in the Preamble is based on concerns that "extensive
discrimination against women continues to exist." Yet the
foundational document, the UDHR is actually about "sex," not
"women," and CEDAW makes a leap from that language
to
"women" because of this extensive discrimination against
women. And while the continued need for international
protection for women's rights is patent, "women" cannot be the
beginning, middle and end of the story on international sex
discrimination law.
One may consider that, given the complexity of the
meaning of "women," CEDAW's non-definition of women may
have been an act of purposeful vagueness. 9t Parties to a contract
gloss over differences through imprecise language to conclude a
91The relative paucity of historical documents relating to the drafting of
CEDAW obscures whether the drafters considered the meaning of the term
"women."
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deal. 92 For example, in discussing CEDAW's provisions, at a
certain point, the drafters decided that further detail should be
avoided to permit flexibility for countries. 93 This decision may
reflect the impetus for drafters of international treaties to avoid
contested language that may undermine widespread
ratification. 94 That vagueness served a political purpose at the
time, unifying State Parties that may have disagreed on a
definition. The use of the term "women," we could infer,
avoided the minefields of possible alternatives. Defining women
in CEDAW would have raised debates such as those that arose
concerning the use of "gender" in the Rome Statute. Indeed, it
could have derailed efforts at transnational unity, although it
seems unlikely given the extent to which "women" functioned as
a unitary category more broadly at the time of CEDAW's
drafting than in the late 1990s as debate over the Rome Statute

92 See Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in
DeliberatelyIncomplete Contracts,2004 Wis. L. REv. 389 (2004).

93As reflected in discussions in 1974:

The view was expressed that, subject to certain important but
comparatively minor modifications and amendments, the
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women fulfilled the criteria for an acceptable convention.
The temptation to add more detailed clauses to the
Declaration should be resisted, so as to avoid difficulties
for countries which wished to apply the general provisions
in different ways. The opposite opinion was also
expressed, however, that, though some of the provisions of
the proposed draft convention might not be acceptable to
all countries because of their existing legislations, the
convention should be seen as a challenge and national
legislations should in course of time be brought into
conformity with those provisions.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on the Status of Women, Report on
the Twenty-Fifth Session, p. 30, U.N. Doc. E/5451 (Supplement No. 4), E/CN.
6/589 (Jan. 25, 1974).
94Here, David Kennedy points out the commonplace practice of watering
down international human rights provisions to persuade more states to accede to
the treaty in question. See KENNEDY, supra note 20, at 24-25; see also REHOF,
supra note 86, at 2-3 (noting that countries worried that the Convention would
have a detrimental impact on the cultural and social make-up of their societies,
causing these real considerations to be "cloaked in vague concepts and terms").
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began. 95 "Women" served a clear purpose in the positivist legal
project of international women's rights. The project's purpose
relies on the centrality of the term "women," which advanced
States Parties' apprehension of the meaning of their international
commitment. 96 "Women" both legitimized and narrowed
international remedies. It served as an organizing concept around
which this positivist project could arise.
CEDAW, to the extent it has succeeded, depends on
"women," both as a concept and as a group. "Women" as a
group of people have played a central role as actors working
toward the limited successes of the project. International
women's rights activists have dedicated their energies, and in
some cases, their lives, toward establishing CEDAW's
legitimacy. An honest assessment of the costs and benefits of the
centrality of "women" in CEDAW may help us recognize the
limitations that result from certain political choices.
C.

The False Universals and Certainties of "Women"

The term "women" created a cross-cultural site to resist
fragmentation by other identity traits, such as nationality, class,
race and religion. 97 The biological specificity of "women"
served as the central category around which states could enter
into precise agreements. The chief evidence for this universality
is that the central term in the Convention, "women," is not even
95 See generally Valerie Oostervcld, The Definition of "Gender" in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for
International Criminal Justice, 18 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 55 (2005).
96 Using Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal's definition, international
law derives legitimacy from three elements of the relationship between states and

international bodies: obligation, precision and dclegation. Abbott & Snidal,
supra note 55, at 38; see also Kenneth W.Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and
Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 424 (2000). By each
of these measures, the term "women" plays a crucial role. The then-perceived
universality of the term created the conditions for panics to bind themselves to
an international treaty that obligated them to report the status of women to the
CEDAW Committee. Id. at 57-58. Although CEDAW, as a reporting convention,
involves little delegation, the delegation by states to the international body also
presupposes the use of an uncontested term that would serve as the subject of the
Convention. Id. at 54.
97 Otto, supra note 16, at 106.
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defined: it is so clearly universal that it needs no definition. For
those invested in the current structure of international law, fear
of the fragmentation of this unitary and universalist identity98
motivates continued reinvestment in the term. CEDAW
legitimated the identity-based rights model for other women's
rights efforts. 99
This unitary rhetoric confronts many critiques. Antiessentialist theory questions the utility of a universal group
called "women," targeting it as a reference to white women. 0 0
Comparative law theory exposes fundamental cultural
differences and the limitations of internationalist universalities
such as "women." The meaning of "women" varies from country
to country.'10
Biological commonalities may exist among
women in different countries, but the experience of women
varies not only along national and cultural lines, but also
especially along class lines. 102 Work and family roles vary along
each of these axes, leading to vast disparities that undermine the
concept of a universal "woman. '10 3 Socioeconomic factors
construct the relationship between women and society, both in

98Id. at 105-06.
9 At least part of the legitimacy of international feminist efforts relies on
the "almost contradictory idea of international feminism that all violence against
women all over the world is the same." Lama Abu Odeh, Comparatively
Speaking: The "Honor" of the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West ",1997
UTAH L. REV. 287, 290 (1997).
10 For example, bell hooks and Kimbcr6 Crenshaw have emphasized the
"white nature" of such concepts, asserting that race and gender arc intertwined.
See e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 1-13,
119-58 (1981); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and the Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991).
101 Sex, referring to biological difference, may vary minimally from
country to country. Gender, in contrast, depends on culture and varies
substantially across borders. Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 8, at
801 (citing Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw:
The Disaggregation of Sexfrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. I(1995)).
1021d. at 804.
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its public and
consign women
even abroad. 0 5
and healthcare
"women."106

private iterations. 10 4 Family structures could
to the home or encourage them to work, perhaps
Reproductive policy, daycare, public education,
each shift the nature of the identity of

Each of these socioeconomic factors defines the power
relationship between men and women in different societies.
Even the biological unity of "women" varies depending on the
practice and availability of sex-related surgery, whether for ritual
modification, cosmetic purposes or gender identity-related
surgery. 107 CEDAW's universalist language does not account for
the impact of this contingency on international human rights law.
Those who work with CEDAW may wish to avoid such
contingency, fearing .that it "softens" the already "soft" legal
concepts in international women's human rights law. 10 8 Such
anti-essentialist arguments surface in comparative work on
gender identity that reveals the extent to which universal norms
ignore gender's cultural construction. Cosmopolitan arguments
can provide the theoretical framework for understanding work
that details the complexity of "women" and other gender

104kJ
105

LINDA BOSNIAK,

THE CITIZEN AND

THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS

OF

CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 104-12 (2006).
106htternalizing Gender, supra
07

1

note 8, at 804.

Id.at 801.

0" See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note II, at 66. Soft law
generally refers to legal regimes with limited binding force. See supra note 55
and accompanying text.
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identities. 109These cultural explorations of gender differentials
reflect the dynamic relationship among identities of sex, gender
and sexuality.1 10
CEDAW may be viewed as proto-"Govemance Feminism,"
a term Janet Halley and others use to describe feminist efforts
1
towards occupying key positions in public regulatory efforts.I

109 Cosmopolitanism, a mingling of normative values throughout the
Cosmopolitan
world, revived first by Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and tile
Alternative, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 93-119 (Will Kymlicka ed.,
1995), and then in a different vein by Kwame Anthony Appiah,
COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006), and Paul Schiff
Berman in his work on legal pluralism, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1155 (2007). Thai and Indian gender identities, as Sonia Katyal has
demonstrated, incorporate both sharply divergent gender and sexual identities.
Sonia Kaytal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE JL. & FEMINISM 97, 136-41, 152-67
(2002). Larry CatS Backer has contrasted the constructions -of gender and
sexuality in Malaysia, Zimbabwe and the United States. Larry Cata Backer,
Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, Zimbabwe and
Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (2007). And with regard to the issue of
wearing a veil, several scholars have weighed in on the impact of cultural
difference: Karima Bennoune, Mary Anne Case, Joan Wallach Scott, Madhavi
Sunder and Adrien Wing, to name a few. Karima Bennounc, Secularism and
Human Rights: A ContextualAnalysis of Headscarves,Religious Expression, and
Women s Equality Under InternationalLaw, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367
(2007); Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism and the
Constitutionalizationof Marriage, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM (Beverley
Baines ed., forthcoming 2011); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE
VEIL (2007); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1398 (2003);
the
Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, CriticalRace Feminism Lifts
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the HeadscarfBan, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
743 (2006).

H1o Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructingthe Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender,"and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-AmericanLaw and Society, 83 CALF. L. REV. II(1995).

I

See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 6.
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Beyond the sex trafficking context in which it first arose," 12
Halley references the concept of "Governance Feminism" in
order to criticize interventions to shift international criminal law
towards banning domestic violence practices, which some
scholars have alleged constitutes a "global war against
women."' 13 Halley calls this structuralist feminist agenda
"Feminist Universalism," in which women exist not as a
"particular group of humanity," but rather as a distinct universe

112Feminists achieved success internationally through their efforts which
led to the drafting of the 2000 United Nations Protocol on Trafficking as well as
domestically when, during that same year, the United States congress passed the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 25, Annex 11,U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60,
U.N. Doc. A/45/49. (Vol. I) (2001); Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 106, 114 Stat. 1464.
Both of these achievements had reverberatory effects on other national stages.
See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the
Internationalto the Local inFeminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance
Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 348 (2006).
13 See SPLIT DECISIONS,

supra note 17, at 2.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

that deserves an international law conforming to its needs." t4
Assuming that women's position as victim is ubiquitous, the
Feminist Universalist vision seeks reforms far broader than those
engaged by the early Governance Feminists' efforts to shape

114 Id. at 7. Feminist Universalism reflects some inspiration from Luce
Irirgaray, the French feminist philosopher. LUCE IRIGRARY, THIS SEX WHICH IS
NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1985) (1977). Feminists
have long debated theories of difference. Since the 1970's, French feminist
theory, led by H&lne Cixous, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, has delved into
issues of women's difference from men. Of the three, Irigaray developed the
most explicitly political examination of women's position in society. In that
sense, although no particular philosopher or political theorist has dominated the
debate on Parity in France, Irigaray's philosophy most closely approaches the
theories espoused by the Parity movement. Early on, her philosophy emphasized
the fundamental difference between women and men. One of her most well
known works, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE, explored the social meaning of
women's biological difference from men. Irigaray argues that as men are unitary,
women are multiple, even down to their genitalia. Id. at 23. Women's
multiplicity puts them in the social position of focusing on relational behavior.
Irigaray explored how women's language expressed this relationship-centered
existence, in which women constantly relate to others, consistently referring to
their interlocutors. With regard to women's political role in society, Irigaray has
argued that women, as metaphysically distinct from men, have the right to
citizenship, which reflects their own existence. See Luce Irigaray, L'Identite
Feminine: Biologie ou Conditionnement Social?, in FEMMES: MOITIE DE LA

TERRE MOITIE DU POUVOIR [Female Identity: Biology or Social Conditioning?,in
WOMEN: HALF OF THE EARTH HALF OF THE POWER] 101 (Gisele Halimi ed.,
1994). A number of French feminists disagreed with this "difference" theory,
espousing instead the theory that women have the right to "equal" treatment. See
GILL ALLWOOD &

KHURSHEED WADIA,

1958-2000, 218-19 (2000).

WOMEN AND POLITICS IN FRANCE
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international criminal law. 115
My assertions related to CEDAW's reliance on "women"
as a universal concept reflect how this Feminist Universalism
grew from CEDAW. "Women" was so universal that it needed
no definition, leading decades later to efforts related to other
areas of international law that build on this presumption of
universality. In this Feminist Universalism, as in CEDAW, men's
role in gender is at worst invisible or at best secondary (as in
MacKinnon's Oncale analogy in which men who are victims
may be considered like women). 116 Without the victim-centered
subjectivity of women, Feminist Universalism would have no
"I See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 60. Halley explains that these
early battles were relatively minor and that the feminist consensus was actually
after something "more elusive, more structural." Id. at 59. The goal was to
change "the very classificatory scheme of universal justice." Id. at 61-62. The
Geneva Conventions provided a structure whereby the well being of women was
part of an effort to maintain a "universal human integrity." Id. at 62. As Halley
reveals, the Feminist Universalists believe that "the right of women to be secure
from sexual assault was itself fundamental, central, and of universal scope," and
that female suffering exists separately from that of a male. Id. Halley particularly
criticizes the effort to link the everyday war against women, and all sexual
violence, to war crimes. She points out the lack of a plausible "connection to
armed conflict.'1 15 Id. at 84. Halley writes: "unless you are a radical feminist,
seeing it that way will take an effort of sympathetic imagination. If you can do it,
you have entered into the consciousness of the FU." Id. at 83. FU goes further.
Once the Balkan conflict is "untcthcred" from its ethnic dimensions it becomes
part of the everyday war against women and if "every rape is an expression of
male domination" then for Copelon all rape should be within the scope of
international criminal law. Id. at 64. The feminists efforts in extending the
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC to peace time failed as the Rome Statute
has express provisions limiting its reach to armed conflicts. i. at 112. However,
the ICC does classify persecution on the basis of gender alone as a crime against
humanity and so the very framing of ethno-nationalist conflicts that Halley
detests is now an available tool for a prosecutor in the ICC. Id. at 108. Halley
expresses concern that this success is inattentive to "the possibility that women
have been the instigators or perpetrators of conflict" and also that it permits a
"chilling indifference to the suffering and death of men." Id. at 123. For that
reason in part, Halley dismisses Feminist Universalism as "FU." "
116"Anici recognize that when women and men are sexually violated,
verbally or physically, they are targeted and harmed as women and as men."
Oncale v.Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Brief for the
Nat'l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. etal. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Oncalc v. Sundowncr Offshore Scrvs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No.
96-568), 1997 WL 471814 at *1 (brief authored by Catherine A. MacKinnon)
[hereinafter MacKinnon Brief].
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core meaning.
One might also argue that to the extent that the public
policy-setting agenda of CEDAW did not succeed, it led activists
to seek remedies in international criminal law where remedies
promised stronger enforcement mechanisms. The communities
that advocated for CEDAW's expansion have shifted their sights
to rely on criminalization, which provides an opportunity for
feminists to attain hard law results for some of the core
CEDAW concerns. 117
Feminist Universalists went further, arguing that they
needed to address the gendered social constructs that bolster
male domination. 118 To understand the flaw in CEDAW's
universalist "women," it is imperative we explore how "women"
is not a discrete group and how dangerous CEDAW's reification
of the male/female binary is.
1. "Women" is not a Discrete Category
The framing of CEDAW around "women" reinforces the
binary between men and women in human rights legal discourse.
The part of that binary addressed in CEDAW, "women," fails to
serve as a universal descriptor. Its meaning as part of a binary
with men lacks certainty. 119 One's gender may defy simple
categorization due to biology 120 or by intent to change

117 It is worth noting, though, that CEDAW does not directly address
violence against women.

118See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 83.
119

See Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing:

Transgendered

Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000)
[hereinafter Trapped].
120

See e.g., Nancy Ehrcnrcich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female

Genital Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of 'Cultural Practices,' 40

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (2005) (discussing the plight of intcrsex individuals
and comparing legal arguments regarding corrective surgery for intersex people
to those made related to female genital cutting).
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identity. 121A clear divide between "men" and "women" does not
exist. ' 22 Although most people accept that there are two sexes,
"male" and "female," these categories actually contain a myriad
123
of genders, formed genetically, biologically and culturally. 24
Through these criteria, sexedness is shown to be a continuum. 1
Scientists generally agree that there are seven gender traits that
constitute one's gender identity: 1) chromosomes; 2) gonads; 3)
hormones; 4) internal reproductive organs; 5) external genitalia;
25
6) secondary sexual characteristics; and 7) self identity. 1
The sex binary has many negative effects on public
policy. 26 The ubiquity of the categories "male" and "female"
cannot prove their veracity as the irreducible essence of gender.
Such categories truncate the diversity of gender identity. 127 The
psychological component of "self identity" renders the simple
121Many transgender people transition from one gender to another, with
or without medical assistance, without the purpose of "passing" as the other
gender. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN,
AND THE REST OF Us 65-69 (1994).
122AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1595 (4th ed. 2000) (defining sex
as "either of the two divisions, designated
classification").

female

and male,

of this

123 See Ann Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are
Not Enough, SCIENCES, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 20-21; see also Trapped, supra note
119, at 503.
124JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN 28 (1989).
125 These factors are detailed by Douglas K. Smith in Transexualism, Sex

Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 972 (1971). See
also Trapped, supra note 119, at 504. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court of
New York County used the exact formulation cited above in Maffei v. Kolaeton
Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that a pre-operativc
transgender female is protected by New York City's sex discrimination statute as
a member of the class of males).
126See generally Trapped,supra note 119; David B. Cruz, Disestablishing

Sex and Gender, 90 CALF. L. REV. 997 (1992).
127 This Article will not directly address the relevance of my theory of
gender binarism to feminist theory. Rather, the multiplicity of gender conforms
quite closely to what I interpret as the spirit of contemporary anti-essentialist
feminist theory. See Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory:
The possibility of a Restroom Labeled "Other," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997).
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male/female dichotomy useless, leaving the categories "male"
and "female" wanting. 128
The contemporary evolution of medical technology,
combined with the increasingly commonplace transgender
identity, has further blurred the lines between "men" and
"women." The recent example of medical testing for South
African runner Caster Semenya exposes the open-ended nature
of sex definition.' 29 "Women," a term adopted for its clear
biological reference, turns out not to be as clear as was widely
thought. Thus, given the indefinite nature of the term, it is not a
useful descriptor of a group subject to the protection of
international law. "Women" simply fails to convey the specific
group intended by CEDAW's drafters.
2.

CEDAW Supports the Male/Female Binary

Beyond this literal deconstruction of the biological
meaning of "women," the actual deployment of the term in
women's rights discourse exposes multiple socio-political
meanings. As Dianne Otto argues, the emphasis on certain
"female subjectivities" establishes the "otherness" of women in
women's rights discourse. Otto identifies three "female
subjectivities" reproduced by human rights discourse, 130 each of

12s Trapped, supra note 119, at 504.
129 See Christopher Clarey & Gina Kolata, Gold is Awarded, but Dispute
Over Runner' Sex Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, at B9; Katie Thomas,
A Lab Is Set to Test the Gender of Some Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2008, at DI. As has been widely reported, the diversity of physical gender has
led to the testing of each Olympic athlete to ascertain his or her gender. Id.
Previously, the Olympic committee asked women to perform a "nude parade" to
ascertain their sexes. This proved unworkable as chromosomal tests revealed that
athletes "appearing" as women were actually men. See id.
130 Otto,

supra note 16, at 106.
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which is marginalized by a corresponding masculine subject.131
Each of these opposing visions of the masculine and feminine
"organizes sex/gender as a hierarchy, with the masculine
assuming the position of authority.' 32 The basis for these
subjectivities, I argue, is the identitarian choice of "women" as
the centerpiece of international law on sex and gender.
In reproducing these hierarchical binaries, CEDAW's
133
potential for transforming women's lives is compromised.
Most of the CEDAW provisions follow a formal equality
yardstick, measuring success as the extent to which men have
access to a particular social position. The imprecision of the term
"women" becomes clearer once we consider the different
contexts in which "women" exist-they are wives and mothers,
persons equal to men, and victims. Each of these subjectivities
arouses a legal response within CEDAW. Most important is the
extent to which CEDAW renders invisible the individuals
identified as women that do not fit into these three subjectivities.
I will address these issues directly infra-the point now is to
demonstrate that beyond the biological uncertainty of the term
lies a socio-political imprecision.
D. The Term "Women" Resists Redefinition
Attempts have been made to remedy the shortcomings in
the centrality of "women" so that it reflects the complex
relationship among identity, gender and sexuality. 134 One notable
131 Id. First, the wife and mother requires protection and "is more an
object than a subject of international law." Id. Men, as heads of households, form
the masculine component of this binary. Id. The second subjectivity is the
'formally equal' woman, whose role in public life is measured by the extent to
which it matches the implicit "masculine standard of'equality' against which her
claims to equality are assessed .
I..."
Id. This equality strategy presumes as
normative the masculine standard, thereby fostering a harmful binary that places
women in the inferior position. Id. Third is the female victim "produced by
colonial narratives of gender" and women's perceived "sexual vulnerability." Id.
The male homologue for this subjectivity is "the masculine bearer of
'civilization' and savior of 'good' women from 'bad,' often 'native,' men." Id.
132Id.
33

1 Id. at 117.
34Valdes, supra note I10.
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response by feminists has been to redefine "women" in a broader
sense that recognizes such theoretical developments. Catharine
MacKinnon's work in particular does an admirable job of
expanding and updating the category of "women," but does not
remedy the category's central shortcomings.
MacKinnon has recognized the fact that men may deserve
the protections from sexist power that she originally prescribed
for women. In MacKinnon's work, the alternating explicit and
1 35
implicit subordination of women plays a driving role.
MacKinnon focuses on sexuality as the central source of
women's oppression at the hands of patriarchal power in the
form of "male laws. ' 136 In particular, her argument in the Oncale
same-sex sexual harassment case before the U.S. Supreme Court
reconstructs "women" as a category inclusive of men.
In the Oncale case, MacKinnon argued that when men
suffer from other men's sexual violence, they play the role of
"women," and therefore merit protection under sex

135Catharine MacKinnon's scholarship attempts to demonstrate how the
legal system is fundamentally opposed to women's interests and designed to
perpetuate male dominance. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED]. Her "work centers on the domination of women in the sexual
sphere, highlighting rape, sexual harassment, and pornography." MARTHA
CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 45 (2d ed. 2003)

[hereinafter INTRO]. MacKinnon asserts that, "the sexual use and abuse of
women is the principal mechanism by which women's subordination is
perpetuated." INTRO at 45. During the 1990s, Mackinnon worked to mobilize
people against the mass rapes of thousands of Muslim and Croatian girls and
women by the Serbian military, who used rape as a tactic of "ethnic cleansing."
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women s Human Rights, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1994). "MacKinnon was enraged that the rapes were not
recognized as violations of human rights, even though convincing legal
arguments could be made that they constituted crimes against humanfty, war
crimes, and other violations of international law." INTRO at 112. MacKinnon saw
the rapes as "a sexual tactic designed to achieve political ends." id.
136It is important to note that
recognize the multiplicity of women's
historical forces such as colonialism
religious, and racial differences.

critics have pointed out her reluctance to
experiences, including social, economic or
or the church that affect class, cultural,
See RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE:

POSTCOLONIALISM, SUBJECTS AND RIGHTS 101-02 (2005).
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discrimination law.' 37 "Men's rape of women is a hateful act

designed to reinforce male supremacy. So is men's rape of
men."'138 In Oncale, MacKinnon argues that men deserve Title
VII protection for this type of abuse. 139 Victimized men are
honorary women, "sisters in suffering."'140 In this analysis, the

gender of men is only the subject of rights to the extent that it
exists as analogous to the gender of women. Men only access
protection from gender-based discrimination through their
similarity to women. As some scholars argue, these tangential
rights characterize a limitation of international women's rights
more broadly. 141
Access to rights, even via analogy, is certainly better than
exclusion from rights-winning Oncale was an improvement
over a Title VII jurisprudence that relied on biology as a
dispositive element for claiming victimization. MacKinnon's
argument lifts men out of this exclusion, but at a price. The cost
is that the recognition comes through an analogy situating the
recognition of men's rights as cognizable to the extent they
mirror women's suffering. 142 This analogy has faced criticism in
the context of the attempt to redefine sexual assault as a crime of
"gender," as opposed to "sexual," violence. This criticism is
exemplified in a case in which feminists voiced concern over an
incident because the castrated victim was rendered inferior and
'37See MacKinnon Brief, supra note 116, at 13-14.
"I Rus Ervin Funk, Men Who Are Raped, in MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE
HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMAAND SHAME 222 (Michael Scarce, ed. 1997).
9

13 Id.

140 Id.
"41 See generally SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17. Lara Stemple, Male
Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 627-36 (2009).

142It is worth considering Mary Coombs's focus on the potential plaintiffs
in same-sex sexual harassment cases. She argues that straight men would take
advantage of the right to sue other men for harassment as a sort of gay panic
reaction, leaving gay men in the workplace vulnerable to suit. See Mary Coombs,
Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was it a Victory?, 6 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 113 (1999) (arguing that the expansion of sexual
harassment law to include same-sex sexual harassment would likely lead to the
use of sexual harassment law as a tool of straight men against gay men).
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"like a woman."'143 Halley argues that this argument fosters a
"chilling indifference to the suffering and death of men,"'144 and
that it "reproduces in reverse the blind-spotted moral vision that
it contests."' 145 Indeed, it seems like a perverse reification of
women's victim status to argue that men's victimhood can only
be recognized insofar as it is analogous to that of women.
The MacKinnon theory does important work in
recognizing that sexist oppression targets something broader
than biological women. The theory nonetheless retains an
identitarian focus that impedes the goal of unsexing. Here, men
(for MacKinnon) deserve protection insofar as they may be
defined as having some bit of womanhood.
Finding in men a substitute for "woman" that broadens the
category begins to respond to identity criticisms. Martha
Fineman goes one step further than MacKinnon; in her recent
work, she attempts to redefine victimhood away from gender
toward the position of the vulnerable. 146 Fineman views
vulnerability as the core measure of inequality-a universal
constant that comprises the harms to which humans are
vulnerable.147 A vulnerability approach, she argues, escapes the
rigidity of the suspect class groupings of an equal protection
analysis.' 4 8 Fineman's vulnerability theory introduces a new
143See Rape at Rome, supra note 17, at 123.
144Id.
145Id.

146See Martha Albertson Fincman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE JL.& FEMINISM I, 1(2008).
141Id. Fineman suggests that a vulnerability analysis should replace an
equal protection analysis to shift the focus from discrimination against defined
groups toward inequitable structures. Id. at I. At the same time, she criticizes
liberal notions of equality as weak in the face of subordination and domination.
A liberal model fails to reform institutional arrangements that privilege some and
disadvantage others. Id. at 3. Fineman's core criticism is that the identity
categorized in the equal protection analysis is both over and under inclusive, as
they fail to reflect "lack of opportunity categories" that transcend group
boundaries. Id. at 4.
148Id.

at 12.
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approach to remedying inequality beyond traditional identity
categories. 149 Fineman's work could potentially redefine an
identity-driven construct to an inclusivity and fluidity that would
reflect the reality of human identity. It is possible, however, that
vulnerability as a concept still retains some referent to identity
markers, 150 and that it would be reified into an identity that
absorbs the disadvantages of the term "women."
Women's ordeals do hold a central place in sex and gender
inequality, but this centrality does not necessitate or justify their
placement as the sole identity meriting protection from
discrimination. Ignoring others and the broader power disparities
related to sex can only serve to marginalize CEDAW. Even if
other international instruments such as the ICCPR deal with sex
in a more even-handed fashion, the breadth and depth of
CEDAW's prescriptions reflect a deeper attempt to ignore the
complexity of sex discrimination. Remedies for inequality solely
based on group identity will not rectify sexist policies. Inclusion
of men would lead to greater resources devoted by States Parties
and by the international community. By addressing gender
inequality in all of its manifestations, international law would be
better positioned to accomplish feminist goals. Focusing on
women blinds CEDAW to a broader view of gender equality.
"Women" reflects a crucial shortcoming in CEDAW's text
as viewed from 2011. It is the core term, the identity around
which the entire treaty is constructed. "Women" does not serve
CEDAW's purpose-its use misdiagnoses broader issues of sex
149 Id. at 23. As Fineman suggests, vulnerability analysis focuses
on the
structures our society has and will establish to manage our common
vulnerabilities. Id. at 2. A more active and responsive state would serve to
monitor social equality in a way that the market cannot achieve. Id. at 5. For this
vulnerability analysis to succeed, the state must empower vulnerable subjects,
through redistributive remedies if necessary. Where the state can identify clearly
advantaged and disadvantaged parties, the state must either justify the disparity
or remedy it. Id. at 22.

150For an eloquent anti-essentialist argument in favor of the use of quotas
and other identity-related remedies, see Jane Mansbridgc, The Descriptive
Political Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist Argument, in HAS
LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 19, 30 (Jyttc Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001).

Janet Halley also has an extensive anti-identitarian argument in her "break" from
feminism. See generally SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17.
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and gender. As a consequence, it errs in imagining potential
solutions.
11.

Identity-Based Discrimination as CEDAW's Raison
d'ltre

CEDAW's focus on a universalized notion of "women"
implicitly sought to harmonize the world's different gender
In this Part, I first contrast
systems into a universal one.' 1
CEDAW with the Convention for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) to demonstrate the greater consistencies
in human rights claims made in the context of a non-identity
based treaty construction. Given the advantages of a non-identity
based treaty, I then discuss how a category reference such as
"sex" or "gender" would better address the concerns raised by
CEDAW. The establishment of "women's human rights" may
serve to isolate women's rights rather than make sex
discrimination a central consideration in human rights discourse.
Finally, I point to the Yogyakarta Principles, a non-binding
agreement by international law experts on sexuality and genderrelated rights, as an example of how a non-identity centered sex
or gender treaty could deal with identity.
A. International Law Beyond Identity
Legal theory, as useful as it may be, is not the only source
for this anti-identitarian critique of CEDAW. Other international
treaties that target inequality deal with identity in more nuanced
ways than CEDAW. A key example is the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. CERD entered into force
in 1969, predating CEDAW by twelve years. Both CEDAW and
CERD implement two crucial U.N. covenants: the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the

151 Although this is true, further analysis is required to assess the way in
which other treaties' references to "sex" may counter CEDAW's universalization
effort.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 152 The
Covenants state that the "rights set forth therein are applicable to
all persons without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. ' ' 153 Both these
Covenants address rights at the universal level. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to examine and contrast the effectiveness of

152 Theoretical limitations include the challenge of understanding the
intersection of a group-based rights system, such as CEDAW, and a rights-based
system, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Indeed, some cite the ICCPR as a strong basis for sexuality rights. In
his argument that the ICCPR better serves as a legal basis upon which to ground
the rights of gays and lesbians to procreate than on the basis of the right to
privacy, Professor Aleardo Zanghellini cites the Principles as an example of an
increasing international awareness of the right of sexual minorities to create a
family. Aleardo Zanghellini, To What Extent Does the ICCPR Support
Procreationand Parentingby Lesbian and Gay Men?, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 125
(2008). Practical limitations isolate women's issues from "human rights,"
encouraging human rights professionals to relegate gender inequality concerns to
the province of"women's issues."
'53 World Conference on Human Rights, June 25, 1993, Fact Sheet 22DiscriminationAgainst Women: The Convention and the Committee, A/CONF.
157/24, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
FactSheet22en.pdf.
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these two treaties fully. 154 Rather, my goal is to attend to how

each treaty frames the inequality question before it. Unlike other
human rights treaties of its era, CEDAW focuses on
discrimination suffered by a particular group, as opposed to
grievances that extend beyond an individual identity. 155 Through
154There is some scholarship indicating CERD's efficacy. One significant
difference between CERD and CEDAW is the manner in which they deal with
reservations. Riddle, supra note 49, at 635. Section 2 of Article 20 CERD
provides that:

A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of
this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a
reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation
of any of the bodies established. by the Convention be
allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or
inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this
Convention object to it.
CERD, supra note 25, at art. 20 § 2. The drafters of CEDAW contemplated
restricting reservations by way subjecting them to the veto of member states, but
chose a far more liberal and permissive reservation scheme. Riddle, supra note
49, at 635. In light of the large number of broadly termed reservations under the
women's convention, some argue that had the CEDAW drafters included more
stringent provision like those found in CERD, CEDAW might have yielded more
impressive results. Id.
One scholar argues that the CERD committee has fostered effective
relationships with state parties that have been an integral part of the Treaty's
utility. Ivan Garvalov, The United Nations International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Synergies, in MINORITY
PROTECTION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 249 (Kristen
Henrad & Robert Dunbar eds., 2008). Through Article 9(1), CERD's central
mechanism for checking state compliance, state reports must reference the law,
regulations and judicial mandates that have given force to CERD. Id. It has been
argued that CERD is responsible for a number of meaningful changes in member
state practices affecting treatment of particular minorities. Id. at 270. While the
Treaty's text does not directly reference any minority group specifically, its
application has been broad and flexible and has significant implications for them.
Id. at 277. The CERD committee has had success influencing states' domestic
legislation. Id. at 269; NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (2d ed. 2003). Garvalov notes, for example, that certain
state parties have even chosen to amend their constitutions and laws to closely
conform with CERD's Article I and drafted provisions that expressly prohibit
racial discrimination. Id. at 270.
155It is arguable that the Convention for the Rights of the Child is another
example. One can distinguish CEDAW from the CRC: Although at a particular
moment only a subset of humanity benefits directly from the CRC, because
every human at some point is a child, the CRC is not identity-driven.
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the group status of "women," CEDAW situates women's issues
outside of universal human rights discussions. 15 6 A category
frame, such as "sex" or "gender" would encompass all people
and therefore fit neatly into universalist legal frameworks.
CERD prohibits all discrimination on the basis of race, but
does not limit the range of victims who can be subject to
discrimination or consequent protections.' 5 7 Whereas
approximately half of all humans are women, all individuals
may be construed as having a racialized identity. 158 Thus, race is
a category, not an identity. If CERD were about identity in the
way that CEDAW is, it would specify a particular race, such as
"black" or "of African descent." It does not; any race, defined in
a broad or narrow fashion, can benefit from CERD's protections.
"White" could be construed as a race and "white" individuals in
certain contexts could be protected by CERD. CERD has been
subject to many debates over the recognition of particular
identities, ranging from the non-citizen to the Roma to women.
Although the CERD Committee applies the treaty to racialized
groups, neither the Convention nor the Committee decides
which groups merit international legal protection. For example,
with regard to indigenous communities, one recommendation
points to continued discrimination against those people by
"colonists, commercial companies and State enterprises," and
59
notes that their culture and historical identity are in jeopardy.
Another recommendation encourages State Parties to adopt
measures to protect the Roma people from a wide array of
156Otto, supra note 16.
117 One might argue that in fact CERD does not protect all races. It may be
an impossible feat to protect all races but this does not undermine my' point with
regard to CEDAW. If CERD cannot provide a remedy for discrimination against
all races, how would a revised CEDAW protect all genders? CERD, both in its
text and in its record, makes a markedly better attempt at representing the issues
of a diverse range of races than CEDAW does with regard to sex.
158 1 have not surveyed the anthropological literature, so perhaps there is a
racially homogenous and entirely isolated group of people somewhere in the
world that would disprove this point.

159Convention to End all forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Comm. on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 23:
hidigenousPeoples, U.N. DOC. A/52/I 8, Annex V (Aug. 18, 1997).
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discriminatory practices. 160 The CERD Committee interprets the
Convention broadly, addressing the protection of refugees,
displaced persons and non-citizens, a group that sometimes may
be racialized but is not necessarily defined by race. 161 The
CERD Committee even took steps to recognize the
intersectionality of discrimination with a resolution on the racial

160 Convention to End all forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Comm. on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 27:
Discrimination against Roma, U.N. DOC. A/55/18, Annex V (Aug. 16, 2000).
For example, at the CERD meeting titled "Thematic Discussion on the Question
of Discrimination Against Roma," one speaker argued that "[tihc situation of the
Roma was not merely characterized by racial discrimination. It appeared to result
from a systematic oppression of the Roma people. That oppression was
structural, political and systemic. It was about power and control. To reduce that
situation to a discussion of discrimination would not do it justice." Convention to
End all forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 27: Discrimination against
Roma, 1423r mtg. U.N. Doe. CERD/C/SR.1423. (Sept. I1, 2000). This point
suggests that certain forms of discrimination may be too deeply entrenched to
find a remedy in other anti-discriminatory norms.

161 See Convention to End all forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation
No. 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, U.N. DOC. CERD/C/64/Misc. I 1/
rev.3 (Jan. I, 2004); see also Convention to End all forms of Racial
Discrimination, U.N. Conn. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
General Recommendation No. 22: Article 5 and Refugees and Displaced
Persons, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Aug. 24, 1996). General Recommendation No. 22
emphasizes in this respect that:

(a) All such refugees and displaced persons have the right
freely to return to their homes of origin under conditions
of safety; (b) States parties arc obliged to ensure that the
return of such refugees and displaced persons is voluntary
and to observe the principle of non-refoulement and nonexpulsion of refugees; (c) All such refugees and displaced
persons have, after their return to their homes of origin,
the right to have restored to them property of which they
were deprived in the course of the conflict and to be
compensated appropriately for any such property that
cannot be restored to them. Any commitments or
statements relating to such property made under duress are
null and void; (d) All such refugees and displaced persons
have, after their return to their homes of origin, the right to
participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels
and to have equal access to public services and to receive
rehabilitation assistance.
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62
discrimination targeted toward women.1

CERD's very title reveals its proper focus on systems of
oppression rather than fixed identities, whereas CEDAW is
about women as a group. CERD's text, in addressing a category
of discrimination rather than the identity of its victims, presents
a marked contrast to CEDAW's identitarianism. CERD prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race but does not limit the range of
victims who can be subject to discrimination. CERD's
methodology enables it to retain a focus on the oppression in all
its iterations without regard to a particular, racialized group. This
assessment demonstrates how CEDAW's exclusive focus on
women both isolates gender disparities from core human rights
concerns and leads to marginalization and non-enforcement,
while forestalling real solutions to appalling human rights
dilemmas. This contrast reveals the import of a critical
examination of the choices made by the CEDAW drafters.
CERD and CEDAW reflect an attempt to translate these
rights into the arena of specific forms of oppression-racialized
and sexist oppression. Both conventions stem from one of the
162 lntersectionality postulates that social categories of discrimination,
such as race, sex, religion, nationality and sexual orientation, relate to each other
to form a system of oppression. Kimbcrl6 Crenshaw notes that "[b]y tracing the
categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will
ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or
separable." Crenshaw, supra note 100, at 1244 n.9 ("By tracing the categories to
their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt
the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable."); see generally
Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Lesbian and Gay

"Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1995); Convention to End all forms of
Racial Discrimination, U.N. Comm. on Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 25: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination,
U.N. Doc. A/55/18,' Annex V (Mar. 20, 2000). Certain forms of racial
discrimination may be directed towards women specifically because of their
gender, such as sexual violence committed against women members of particular
racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed conflict; the coerced
sterilization of indigenous women; abuse of women workers in the informal
sector or domestic workers employed abroad by their employers. Racial
discrimination may have consequences that affect primarily or only women, such
as pregnancy resulting from racial bias-motivated rape; in some societies women
victims of such rape may also be ostracized. Women may also be further
hindered by a lack of access to remedies and complaint mechanisms for racial
discrimination because of gender-related impediments, such as gender bias in the
legal system and discrimination against women in private spheres of life.
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purposes of the United Nations-to achieve international
cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all people "without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
Yet here is where CERD and CEDAW diverge. Article I of
CERD begins with a definition:
In this Convention, the term "'racial
discrimination" shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life. 163
CERD centers on racial discrimination but does not single out
any group of victims.
CEDAW mimics CERD's initial definition but veers from
the model by focusing on a group rather than oppressive
categorizations. Article I of CEDAW beings with:
For the purposes of the present Convention,
the term "discrimination against women" shall
mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or
any other field. 164
CEDAW's definition, unlike CERD's, constantly references a
63

1

id.

164CERD,

supra note 25.
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specific group. It looks to the equality of men and women as a
basis for the goal of eliminating discrimination against women.
One can argue that CERD's choice of non-identitarian language
naturally surfaces given the multiplicity of racial discrimination,
whereas throughout the globe, it is women who consistently face
measurable economic and social harms. Although this is true,
CERD arose at a time of anti-colonialist and "Third-World"
discourse in which advocates of racial equality pointed directly
at the subjugation of the "brown people" by the "white
people.' 65 Yet CERD refrained from references to specific
racial groups, while CEDAW put identity at its core.
Some may argue that CERD could not reference a specific
group because of the multi-racial nature of discrimination: one
could not simply present one group, say "black," as requiring
protection from "white" the way that CEDAW can seek to
protect "women" from "men." Race involves an undeniably
complex set of phenomena. Even the most basic understanding
recognizes multiple races. 166 However, the multiplicity of "sex"
and "gender," while not exactly parallel to "race," does contain a
complex amalgam of many factors, biological, cultural, and
social. In comparing CERD and CEDAW, we need not compare
race against sex or gender discrimination. What is relevant is
that sex and gender, like race, are categories that involve
multiple, perhaps innumerable, identities, all of which are
subject to social construction. At the time of CEDAW's drafting,
the discrete categories of "men" and "women" seemed
legitimate representations of all of humanity. Subsequently, it
165 HAIR: THE AMERICAN TRIBAL LOVE-ROCK MUSICAL (1967), available
at http://www.script-o-rama.com/movicscripts/h/hair-script-transcript-play.html
(last visited Mai. 1, 2011). Hair's references to subjugation include the following
line: "The draft is white people sending black people to make war on the yellow
people to defend land they stole from the red people!" Id. The flippant references
to various races points to the essentialism of that era's racial justice movements.

16 As quoted in the U.S. Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia:
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents." 388 U.S. I, 3 (1967). More persuasive is
the recent argument that individuals do not belong to a race but are "racialized,"
that is to say that sociopolitical structures categorize certain phenotypes into
groups. See generally RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE
REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001); TANIA DAS GUPTA, RACE AND
RACIALIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS (2007).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

has become clear that sex and gender diversity reaches far
beyond the male/female binary. CERD's formulation reveals the
weakness of that used in CEDAW.
B. The Categories of "Sex" and "Gender"
Because the problem with "women" is its identity-centered
focus, either "sex" or "gender" would escape the identitarian
problems with "women."' 167 As Part I detailed, "women" is an
168
inaccurate term for what CEDAW seeks to achieve.
167Kathleen Sullivan debates whether the constitution should attend
specifically to sex or women, or rather merely to general principles of nondiscrimination. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women s
Equality, 90 CALF. L. REV. 735 (2002). The United States Constitution is unique
in that it is the only written constitution with a bill of rights that does not
explicitly mandate equality of the sexes. France, Germany, Canada, South Africa
and India all have constitutions that specifically declare that equal protection
means sexual equality. Id. at 735. With the exception of the 19th Amendment
prohibition on sex-based discrimination with respect to voting rights, the
American constitution makes no specific declaration on sexual equality, as such.
Id. at 737. Instead, with only the general provisions of the equal protection
clause to guide, the Supreme Court has inferred sexual equality. Id. at 739
(noting the "inventiveness and strategic brilliance" of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg). Sullivan then details a few of the courts landmark decision and some
of the challenges the court faced as it looked for sexual equality in equal
protection. The Equal Protection Clause was a product of slavery and deepseated racial inequality. Thus, convincing courts that such a broad provision
could specifically remedy sexual inequality called for some analogy. Id. at 742.
Like race, "sex is a visible and generally immutable characteristic." Id. at 744.
However, while race is considered a social construct, the courts have often
described sex as a biological construct. Id. That is, there are inherent differences
between the sexes, or in the Court's terms, "real differences." Sullivan, also
compares the history of female and African American oppression-a comparison
of "romantic paternalism" versus "the fear and loathing that characterized the era
of American apartheid," a pedestal versus an auction block. Id.
168 That is not to say that the women's movement lacked any gender
consciousness. To take one example, FREE TO BE YOU AND ME, a revolutionary
mid-1970's educational film about sex differences, touted men who cry, boys
who want dolls, and girls who wanted to be doctors and lawyers, while mocking
boyish boys and girly girls. FREE TO BE YOU AND ME (Bell Records 1972).
Featured songs include IT's ALRIGHT TO CRY sung by football star Rosic Greer,
and WILLIAM'S DOLL, performed by Alan Alda and Mario Thomas. The film
targeted secondary sex traits with the scene of two babies trying to figure out
who was a boy and who was a girl. Even this progressive film stood on the
presumption of a real biological difference between men and women, even as it
tried to tear social meaning from the male/female binary.
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CEDAW's focus stands apart from many other human rights
instruments. Framing issues as about "women," implicitly in
contrast to "men" reifies an oppositional binary that preordains
"women" as losers in this counterproductive relationship.
CEDAW's focus on the class of women as opposed to the
classification of sex or gender debilitates the Convention's69
ability to imagine potential solutions to gender inequality.1
CEDAW should instead deploy one or both of two category
terms: "sex" and "gender." Either term moves past binarist
constructs toward understanding relationships that concern not
just one group of people.
"Sex," in contrast to "gender," refers generally to a
biological difference. Although feminist theory has largely and
rightly run from biological essentialism, references to biological
categories may be useful, particularly given how mutable they
are. "Sex" as a term had a more formally neutral meaning at the
time of CEDAW's adoption, a meaning that has shifted with
technology. Today, the increasingly common transition between
"sexes" comes with a realization that for many,
"sex" (manifested in changeable bodies) is more fluid than
"gender" (embodied in a less mutable self-identity).
Although some deploy "gender" as a synonym for women,
it is not-men have gender as well. Gender, in contrast to "sex,"
is commonly understood to reflect social and cultural traits
typically associated with sex. As Joan Wallach Scott explains,
"gender is the social organization of sexual difference. But this
does not mean that gender reflects or implements fixed and
169See Sullivan, supra note 168, at 747. Sullivan engages in a thought
experiment of interest from a United States constitutional perspective. In the
context of a discussion on what jurisprudential decisions a "hypothetical setof
feminist drafters [would] face if they were to constitutionalize women's
equality," this article lays out five axes of choice, a few of which may be helpful
in thinking about the CEDAW argument. Id. They are: (I) between a general
provision favoring equality or a specific provision favoring sex equality, (2)
between limiting classifications based on sex or protecting the class of women,
(3) between reaching only state discrimination or reaching private discrimination
as well, (4) between protecting women from discrimination or also guaranteeing
affirmative rights to the material preconditions for equality, and (5) between
setting forth only judicially enforceable or also broadly aspirational equality
norms. Id. Sullivan contrasts general equality provisions with those that
reference either "sex" or "women."
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natural physical differences between men and women; rather,
gender is the knowledge that establishes meaning for bodily
differences."' 170 The key contribution of "gender," Scott argues,
is its "rejection of the biological determinism implicit in the use
of such terms as 'sex' or 'sexual difference'."' 71 Gender conveys
the broader context in which meaning is assigned to certain
social traits, some of which may have some biological
connection, but many of which do not.
Gender's meaning is the subject of intense contestation at
the international level, as Valerie Oosterveld has argued.
Conservative forces, such as the Vatican, advocate the usage of a
limited definition that leaves no room for sexuality or fluidity in
gender identity.
The international legal use of the term "gender," much like
the term "women," has acquired wide currency without a clearly
used definition. Oosterveld describes the United Nations
approach on defining "gender" as "minimalist, 172 in which it
does not really define the term at all. 173 The term was included in
the Beijing Platform without being defined, although the
President of the Conference was pressured by opposing states
into making a statement which declared that the term was
"intended to be interpreted . . . in its ordinarily, generally
accepted usage.'174
Three sites for international debate on the term "gender"
reveal the political sensitivity that greets this debate. First, at the
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, certain
170

JOAN WALLACH ScoTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 2

(1988). Scott continues by stating "[w]c cannot see sexual difference except as a
function of our knowledge about the body and that knowledge is not 'pure,'
cannot be isolated from its implication in a broad range of discourse contexts."
Id.
M Id. at 29.
172
Oostcrvcld, supra note 95, at 66.
173The term has appeared in United Nations' documents without any overt
or implicit explanation of its meaning for over a decade. Id.

174Id.

at 67.
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conservative states strongly opposed the inclusion of the word
"gender," fearing the "term might sanction rights based on
sexual orientation.' 1 75 Second, the term aroused substantial and
overt debate in the negotiations over the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.176 As in Beijing,
states that sought to retain the term "gender" were "committed to
ensuring that any definition adopted would reflect that 'gender'
refers to socially constructed understandings of what it means to
be male or female."'177 The states that opposed the term "insisted
on reference to 'two sexes' and agreed on the inclusion of a
reference to the broadly-phrased 'society'.'78
Third, more recent uses have involved a clearer definition,
one whose meaning emphasizes that it is a social construction,
influenced by culture and that "the content of 'gender' can vary
within and among cultures, and over time."'1 79 The World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund have adopted and currently

175h. at

62.

176 Many feminists engaged in the debate around the passage of the Rome
Statute and the creation of the International Criminal Court sought broader use of
the term "gender," an effort that became the subject of extensive maneuvering.
i.

177
(.

at 64.

171 Oostervcld, supra note 95, at 64. Oosterveld correctly recognizes that
it is important to predict how the ICC will interpret the term because their
interpretation will "have a direct impact on the kinds of cases of persecution that
the court may be able to prosecute, as well as on the law applied ... and on the
protection and participation of victims and witnesses." Id. at 57. She points out
that United Nations interagency definitions may favor women's rights more
clearly, but they have been eclipsed by the minimalist approach at the
multilateral level precisely because states disagree on the definition with great
conviction. Obviously, the Rome Statute departs from the minimalist trend at the
multilateral level, as it contains an explicit definition of the term. Nevertheless,
the definition ultimately adopted in the Statute is far removed from the detailed
United Nations' approach. Id.
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enforce explicit gender equality norms. 180 Gender
mainstreaming has become a widespread practice in
international institutions to incorporate gender perspectives into
contexts not necessarily related to sex or gender, including
increasing gender diversity in these international institutions. 181
It includes the public policy of assessing the ramifications of
policies on different genders, and its efforts to facilitate the
inclusion82 of women and gender issues in all United Nations'
efforts. 1
Although "gender" arouses the opposition of conservative

180See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: The Economic Imperative
for Women' Corporate Leadership, 6.1 BERKELEY Bus. L J. 55 (2010)
[hereinafter Feminizing Capital]. In this article I discuss the implications of the
adoption of gender equality norms in both directions-in advancing these norms,
but also in defining them in ways that benefit international financial institutions.
My' argument, that this interaction reflects a symbiosis between public and
private sectors, builds on Kerry Rittich's work. Kerry Rittich, Engendering
Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L. REv. 575 (2003) (analyzing a
World Bank report that proposes a strategy that rests on the use of market
incentives to discourage gender discrimination, rather than the international law
approach of holding the state responsible for gender equality); Kerry Rittich, The
Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporationof the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199, 200 (2004) (emphasizing
market-centered types of social equality and inclusion, social justice is framed in
market terms, which focuses on changes that yield economic results).
181 CHRISTINE CHINKIN & FLORENCE BUTEGWA, GENDER
MAINSTREAMING IN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS 25-32 (2001).
512 Id. Critics of gender mainstreaming argue that the use of "gender" in
"gender mainstreaming" simply reifies the male/female binary. Johanna Bond
argues that gender mainstreaming cannot truly implement change because it does
not rise to the level of inclusiveness that intersectionality does. According to
Bond, intersectionality requires more than "adding women to the mix," yet
gender mainstreaming "merely requires that both men and women be included as
analytical subjects" and "tends to be essentialist" in that it "treats women as a
monolithic group." Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A
Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women " International Human Rights
Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 140 (2003). Bond criticizes the top-down approach
of gender mainstreaming as ignoring the extent to which other systems of
oppression work in tandem with sex discrimination.
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states, it does not necessarily contain a particular perspective. 183
Joan Scott argues that "gender" does not incorporate some
particular normative stance as to how it exists or what should be
changed: "[a]lthough gender in this usage asserts that
relationships between the sexes are social, it says nothing about
why these relationships are constructed as they are, how they
work, or how they change."' 184 In this sense, conservative states
that oppose the use of "gender" may be mistaken. Although the
content of the meaning of "gender" as I use it runs counter to
certain conservative norms, "gender" does not necessarily

183 Opponents of "gender" may rely on the potential of a return to the
clearer time when feminists sought rights for "women." Women, whose issues
could be divorced from that of humans. Women, whose issues could be handled
as an afterthought by largely male-run states. Unsexing CEDAW could place
women's issues back into the orbit of human rights by focusing on "gender," a
reality that affects everyone's lives.
184SCOTT, supra note 171, at 32-33.
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involve fluidity in sexual norms. t85 It may be argued that the
women/gender dichotomy is a false one, or that "gender" is a

185 That said, it is unsurprising that conservative states oppose attention to
gender. Even though the current text of CEDAW does not reference gender,
CEDAW opposition groups in the U.S. are concerned that the document already
seeks to legalize same-sex marriage. Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should
Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263,
273-74 (2002). Opposition groups point to actions by CEDAW's Committee that
suggested that state laws against lesbianism be abolished and that "lesbianism be
reconceptualized as a sexual orientation." Laurel MacLeod & Catherine
Hurlburt, Concerned Women for America Strongly Oppose CEDAW,
CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA (2000), available at http://www.cwfa.org/
printerfriendly.asp?id=1971&department=cwa&%20categoryid=nation. If the
text was changed to "gender," the outcry from conservative groups against
CEDAW because of fear of homosexual and transgender rights would likely be
louder. The Yogyakarta Principles, which directly deal with issues of gender and
sexuality, enshrine much of what conservative states fear about a revised
interpretation of CEDAW. See The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 23.
Opposition to using "gender" has already surfaced during the negotiation of
other international treaties. While negotiating the Rome Treaty, conservative
nongovernmental organizations distributed lobby papers calling for the deletion
of both "gender balance" and the reference to judicial expertise in sexual and
gender violence. Oosterveld, supra note 95, at 61. Such groups believed that
using the term "gender sensitivity" would "undermine traditional moral,
cultural[,] and traditional values." DAVID M. KENNEDY, CTR. FOR INT'L STUD.,
IMPARTIALITY IN THE ELECTION OF JUDGES (2005), available at http://
www.worldfamilypolicycentcr.org/wfpc/About the WFPC/papers/
iccreport.html#AppH 1.Groups opposed to the use of the term "gender" wanted
a definition that only referred to "the two sexes, male and female." See
Oosterveld, supra note 95, at 65. Certain conservative groups also made their
views on the term "gender" known at the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action and the 1996 Habitat World Conference. Id. at 65-66.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

luxury suited to developed countries. 8 6 As referenced above,
controversy greeted the debate over whether the Beijing
'
Conference was about "sex" or "gender."' 87
My goal here is not to resolve the "sex"/"gender" dispute
in favor of one term or the other--each term has advantages and
disadvantages. Rather, my point is that either term deploys a
category reference that leaps past the identitarian focus of
"women." Sometimes these terms flip as people deploy social
constructivist arguments "when convenient, and biologically
essentialist ones at other times."' 88 Policy arguments follow
"sex" and/or "gender" used in "contradictory ways."' 189
Regardless of this imprecision, in the context of CEDAW, either
term performs a radical shift in international law when
contrasted with "women." "Gender" and "sex" each avoid
referencing a specific group identity, and either succeeds in
bringing us away from group-based constructions of rights that
impede the goals of gender equality. It is beyond the scope of
86 Others may argue that the use of the term "gender" is a luxury,
available and useful in the more gender-balanced nations of the developed world.
See RHONDA COPELON, WRITING GENDER INTO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:

Substantial resistance to
the use of "gender" in the place of "women" that surfaced at the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing focused on the fear of a shift away from
women's oppression. Some asserted that "gender" watered down their efforts:
"the focus on gender, rather than women, had become counter-productive in that
it had allowed the discussion to shift from a focus on women, to women and
men, and finally, back to men." Sally Baden & Anne Marie Goetz, Who Needs
[Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]?: Conflicting discourses on gender at
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT STATUTE (2000).

Beijing, in FEMINIST VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT: GENDER ANALYSIS AND POLICY

19, 21 (Cecile Jackson & Ruth Pearson ed., 1998) (paraphrasing Nighat Khan of
Pakistan).
187 Id. at 25-26. The conservative reaction to "gender" "highlighted
inconsistencies and areas of neglect in contemporary feminist approaches to the
constitution of gender identity and political subjectivity" Id. In one conservative
essay distributed at the NGO Forum, author Dale O'Leary translates the feminist
code words of "free choice in reproduction" as limitless abortions and "lifestyle"
as homosexuality. Id.
88

Id. at 31.

189 Id. at 21. For instance, the rejection of gender in the conference
document was believed to signify homophobia, but one lesbian woman stated
she was "born a lesbian." Id. at 31.
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this Article to assert whether one of these terms surpasses the
other in some fashion; what does matter is that either moves
beyond the identitarianism of "women."
C. Anti-Women Discrimination or Human Rights?
CEDAW relies on an anti-discrimination model that places
"women" in a central position as the only current and potential
victims. -Discrimination implies an identity-related focus,
particularly when paired with a specific group identity. Although
CERD's framework utilizes non-identitarian language, it permits
remedies that account for specific iterations of discrimination
that do not presume a fixed identity. Article 1 clearly defines
discrimination: "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms."' 190
CEDAW's definition is broader than this, but, at least in the
Convention's title, it identifies "women's" suffering as
discrimination, rather than a pervasive set of oppressive social
relations, discrimination that surpasses the confines of any
specific group of victims. 191 With this identity-driven core,
CEDAW focuses on women as if they were a discrete group,
akin to a minority in the level of protections accorded. This
discrimination model constructs an oppositional world of
discriminators and their victims. CEDAW's urge to "eliminate
all forms of discrimination against women" frames women as
victims of discrimination by an unspecified person or group,
impliedly men.
Critiques of international human rights law focus on the
extent to which its purported universality falls short by virtue of
the exclusion of the private sphere in which much oppression
19 2
This exclusion of the private sphere, CEDAW's
occurs.
'9

CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. 1.

191 To the extent that CEDAW reflects this continued emphasis on a
discrimination model over a human rights model, it may also reflect United
States feminists' predominance at the time of CEDAW's drafting.
192

Engle, supra note 15, at 143.
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advocates urged, harmed women disproportionately. Even before
CEDAW's adoption, the debate arose as to whether women
should be included more vigorously in broader international
human rights norms or whether identifying "international
women's human rights" would be the best way to both get
human rights to take notice of women and to get women a place
at the international law table. 193
Advocates sought to delineate separate rights for women
because they viewed already-established human rights norms as
focusing on the public context and thereby excluding women's
concerns. 194 The women's-rights-are-human-rights strategy
aimed at forcing the international recognition that femalespecific human rights violations are universal human rights
violations, and at instituting gender mainstreaming.' 95 Some,
notably Karen Engle, have attempted to move beyond the

193
Id. at 144.
194 Hilary Charlesworth,

What are "Women's International Human

Rights"?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 58, 63 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).

Charlesworth notes that "as in all areas of international law, women have been
almost entirely excluded from the important human rights fora where standards
are defined, monitored, and implemented." Id. See also Otto, supra note 16, at
121.
195 Id. at 121-22. The success of the first goal is manifested in the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW). G.A.
Res. 48/104, U:N. DOC. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994). However, Otto notes that
DEVAW does not state that violence against women is a violation of human
rights generally. Furthermore, focusing on violence against women replicates the
passive, vulnerable female subjectivity. The condemnation of cultural violent
practices also replicates the "native victim" subject. Id. at 122. The gender
mainstreaming goal has also been "met with considerable success," as
demonstrated through "the adoption of General Comments or General
Recommendations that provide authoritative interpretations of the coverage of
women's rights by the treaty texts." Id. at 123. Although Otto recognizes that
"the extensive cataloging of women's injuries and disa~tvantages [is] ... clearly
necessary for making women's human rights abuses legally cognisable," she also
asserts that the mainstreaming approach "continues to affirm the masculinity of
the universal subject who needs no special enumeration of his gender-specific
injuries." Id. Because of this "dynamic," Otto believes that it may be
"impossible" to disrupt "gender hierarchies through human rights law." Id. at
124. See also Engle, supra note 15, at 144.
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distinction, 196 in part by arguing that women should take
advantage of both sides of the public/private divide. 197
Mainstream "human rights" law may remove gender
justice projects from its scope because of CEDAW's separate
focus on "women." Efforts to remedy women's suffering from
sex discrimination need not exclude remedies for other effects of
sex discrimination. Yet the implementation of CEDAW requires
national governments to report on, and therefore emphasize,
women's suffering from sex discrimination. It is in this sense
that CEDAW, by no ill-intent, serves to create a focus for
domestic compliance with international sex discrimination law.
National governments, by virtue of CEDAW, can comply with
98
international law solely by considering women's issues. 1
In this way, concentrating exclusively on women both
isolates gender disparities from core human rights concerns and
forestalls real solutions to appalling human rights dilemmas.
Reassessing the discrimination model reveals the importance of
reinserting "women" into human rights considerations.
Catharine MacKinnon, referencing an old debate in international
law circles, recently asked "[a]re women human?"'199 CEDAW's
position outside of much human rights discourse suggests that
196 "Not only does such a focus often omit those parts of women's lives
that figure into 'public,' however that gets defined, it also assumes that 'private'
is bad for women. It fails to recognize that the 'private' is a place where many
have tried to be (such as those involved in the market), and that it might
ultimately afford protection to (at least some) women." Engle, supra note 15, at
146.
197 Engle argues that "women should be more like market actors, using the
protection and the promise of the public and private, depending on their
particular perceived needs." Id. at 151.

191 Further research could demonstrate whether national governments
indeed systematically address women's issues to the exclusion of other forms of
sex discrimination. Selected examples of national reports to the CEDAW
Committee reveal a focus, largely exclusive, on women's issues. See e.g.,
France, Sixth periodic report on implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/
C/FRA/6 (April 6, 2006); Brazil, Sixth Brazilian Report to the Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/
C/BRA/6 (Aug. 29, 2005).

199 See ARE WOMEN HUMAN?, supra note 58.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

they are not.
The women-centered human rights strategy not only reified
the sex binary, but it also moved women's rights further from the
human rights agenda. 200 To correct this unintended effect of
CEDAW, advocates began discussing women's rights-as-human
rights.201 This approach sought to demonstrate that womenspecific rights violations are also human rights violations .202 The
other goal of this approach is the "mainstreaming" of women's
issues into the general human rights discourse, an effort less
fraught with identitarian offenses but still one that "continues to
affirm the masculinity of the universal subject who needs no
03
special enumeration of his gender-specific injuries.'
Dianne Otto argues that the most promising solution to the
aforementioned dilemmas of women's identity and the
relationship between women's rights and human rights would be
the creation of human rights law that recognizes gender identity
as a "hybrid result of choices and desire, rather than either male
or female. '204 In this re-emphasis of the human rights model's
relevance regarding gender issues, sexuality-related rights must
figure at the core of the construction of gender-based rights.
Gender, with its explicit focus on social and cultural
relations, could bring sexuality into the architectural center of
international human rights law. Conservative states feared
precisely the implied meaning of "gender" as "sexual
200 i.at 120. Charlesworth and Chinkin have argued that the creation of a
women's branch of human rights law has facilitated its marginalization.

CHARLESWORTH &

CHINKIN,

supra note I1,at 218. They note that mainstream

human rights institutions have "tended to ignore the application of human rights
norms to women." Id.
201I.

202 Id. at 122. One of its main achievements was the recognition of
gendered violence as a human rights violation, however, a considerable amount
of energy was expended on detailing the practices of non-Western culturesgiving "new credence to the "'native victim' subject." IM.
at 123.

203ld.
20

4 Id. at 126.
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orientation." The absence of this consideration under CEDAW is
one crucial casualty of its emphasis on "women. '20 5 Decisions
regarding sexual and reproductive freedom, prevention and care
for HIV-related illness and other sexuality-related rights belong
at the core of an international treaty. The existence of many
culturally different constructions of gender reveals the limitation
of CEDAW's emphasis on the category "women." Given the
interaction of these categories, an international convention on
"women" should also be a convention on gender and sexuality.
Gender differentials reflect the dynamic relationship among
identities of sex, gender and sexuality, as Frank Valdes 20has
7
explored. 206 These relations necessarily vary across cultures.
An example of a potential source for such a radical change
in human rights discourse is the Yogyakarta Principles (the
"Principles"), a non-binding statement by international law
experts from twenty-five countries. 20 8 Responding to the "need
for a more comprehensive articulation of [sexual orientation and
gender identity] rights in international law"2 9 and to the desire
for a "more consistent terminology to address issues of sexual
orientation and gender identity," each of the twenty-nine
Principles articulate how international human rights law should
205 It is worth noting that conservative states might attempt to increase
their reservations in a treaty based on gender rather than "women."
206See generally

Valdes, supra note 110.

207 See generally Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Refraining
Identity-Based Equality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2008) [hereinafter
Loving Gender Balance].

208 The experts met from November 6-9, 2006, at Gadjah Mada
University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to draft a document articulating principles of
international human rights law in relation to gender identity and to sexual
orientation, the so-called Yogyakarta Principles ("the Principles"). Michael
O'Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTs. L.

REv. 207, 232-34 (2008). O'Flahcrty served as Rapportcur for the development
of the Principles.
209Id.at 232; Louise Arbour, U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Address
to the International Conference on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Human Rights (July 26, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huricane/huricane.nsf/view0 1B9 1AE5265 ID33FODC 12571 BE002F I72C?
opendocument).
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protect gender and sexuality rights. 210 Although the Principles
suggest how states should implement such legal obligations,
they have not yet attained any formal legal status at the
international level and have only been used as an advocacy
tool. 211 The Principles have been translated into the six
languages of the United Nations and have become the subject of
substantial international attention and debate by legislative
bodies, NGOs and groups advocating sexual and gender
minority rights. 212 The Principles convey a core value in the
"freedom to express oneself, one's identity and one's sexuality,
without state interference based on sexual orientation or gender

210 See

O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 209, at 232-34.

2 See id. According to the Rapporteur for the Principles, the conclave
intended the principles to serve a tripartite function: (1)"constitute a 'mapping'
of the experiences of human rights violations experienced by people of diverse
sexual orientations and gender identities"; (2) clear and precise application of
international human rights law to such experiences; and (3) a detailed list of the
obligations on States for "effective implementation of each of the human rights
obligations." Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 23.
212
CATHOLIC

O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 209, at 237-47; Piero A. Tozzi,
FAMILY AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS INST.,

Six Problems with the

"Yogyakarta Principles" (2002), available at http://www.c-fam.org/docLib/
20080610_Yogyakarta Principles.pdf.
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identity.'2 13 Although such rights efforts may fail to achieve

213The Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 23, at art. 19. The drafters
organized the Principles as follows: Principles I to 3 address "the universality of
human rights and their application to all persons without discrimination, as well
as the right of all people to recognition before the law"; Principles 4 to 11
address "fundamental rights to life, freedom from violence and torture, privacy,
access to justice and freedom from arbitrary detention"; Principles 12 to 18
address "non-discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights, including employment, accommodation, social security, education and
health"; Principles 19 to 21 address "the freedom to express oneself, one's
identity and one's sexuality, without State interference based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, including the rights to participate peaceably in
public assemblies and events and otherwise associate in community with others";
Principles 22 to 23 address "the rights of persons to seek asylum from
persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity;" Principles 24 to 26
address "the rights of persons to participate in family life, public affairs and the
cultural life of their community, without discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity"; Principle 27 addresses "the right to defend and
promote human rights without discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity, and the obligation of States to ensure the protection of human
rights defenders working in these areas"; Principle 28 to 29 affirm "the
importance of holding rights violators accountable, and ensuring appropriate
redress for those who face rights violations." O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra note
209, at 234-35.
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more than the backlash they provoke, 214 or may fail to gamer
substantial international support, the Principles do reflect a
potential solution to the bind in which CEDAW sits, where the
centrality of "women"
may hamper progress on issues of gender
215
and sexuality rights.
In sum, the establishment of "discrimination" and
"women's human rights" confronts substantial theoretical and
practical challenges in the centrality of group identity.
Expansion to include both "gender" and "sex" would improve
the debate by shifting away from thinking about these issues as
214

Emma Mittelstaedt, Comment, Safeguarding the Rights of Sexual

Minorities: The Incremental and Legal Approaches to Enforcing International
Human Rights Obligations, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 365-66, 384. (2008).
According to Mittelstacdt, holding signatories accountable to uphold their
obligations under treaties onto which they have signed actually results in antiGLBT legislation in some signatory States. Id. at 384-85. The author cites
Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, South Korea and Guatemala as examples of
countries that have signed on to some international agreement that theoretically
protects the rights of sexual minorities. The author advocates "an incremental
approach to human rights" by the international community, which "would better
serve the aims of improving LGBT rights worldwide." Id. at 385. Because the
Principles have not yet been adopted by any State, Mittclstaedt offers no
hypothesis as to how the Principles might be received by any of the countries she
includes as scenarios where the international community pushed too hard for the
rights of sexual minorities. See id. The author does correctly point out, though,
that the Principles emphasize not only the responsibilities of States, but also the
responsibilities of the media, human rights institutions, NGOs and financial
supporters. Id. at 366. Although she includes no particular examples, Mittelstaedt
states that "[tihe Principles ...reveal a trend toward utilizing nonstate actors to
impose international law and norms upon unwilling, or at least resistant,
nations." Id. (emphasis added).
215It is worth noting that this raises compliance issues. For that reason, the
Yogyakarta Principles recognize the value of transnational networks in focusing
on non-state actors. The drafters deployed broad definitions of sexual
orientation, gender and gender identity. Although the drafters note that the
Principles "must rely on the current state of international human rights law" and
thus will require international law revision to reflect legal developments, it is
worth noting that the recommended actions are not only addressed to States, but
also to NGOs, the media, and other non-state actors. O'Flaherty & Fisher, supra
note 209, at 237. According to O'Flaherty and Fisher, the drafters believed they
should recommend action points to other relevant actors who may protect and
promote the rights of sexual minorities. There arc some sixteen
recommendations directed at international governmental and non-goveinmental
organizations as well as international rights and treaty bodies, human rights
institutions and commercial organizations.
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solely affecting the group known as "women," who are
positioned as "victims" of "discrimination." One answer may
involve shifting from an identity-centered treaty toward a rightsbased treaty, as embodied in CERD or the Yogyakarta Principles.
I1.

Include all Sexes

CEDAW fails on its own terms of equality between men
and women. Women cannot become equal to men unless men
are part of the solution. Women's ordeals still matter, but
ignoring men and broader gendered power disparities cannot
further CEDAW's goal of equality between men and women.
CEDAW's premise is that women are the victims, leaving those
who are not women-i.e., men-as the perpetrators of the
discrimination. This binarist construction of gender excludes
men from both the diagnosis of, and the remedy to gender
oppression.
This Part will demonstrate the critical importance of
upending the gender binarism inherent in CEDAW. First, to
understand how CEDAW constructs/excludes other sexes, we
must understand CEDAW's framing of women themselves.
Second, transgender people emerge as the most clearly excluded
individuals. Transgender people are no "third sex, ' '2 16 but
deserve to be subjects and expose the fallacy of the sex binarism
itself. Third, men do not appear in CEDAW, except as shadow
comparators for women's equality and implicit perpetrators of
their inequality. Instead, because men also face substantial harm
due to sex discrimination, men should be placed alongside other
sexes in international sex discrimination law.
A.

Recognize Women's Agency

It may seem senseless to say that CEDAW excludes
women when "women" are its sole focus. The Convention
purportedly represents them, but only in the circumscribed
subjectivities it establishes. CEDAW essentializes what
"women" means in part by overlooking the many forms of
216William Eskridge, Law and the Construction of the Closet: American
Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 82 IOWA L. REv 1007, 1079 (1997)
(referencing discussions of a "third sex" as a trope to describe gender and sexual
non-conformists).
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intersectionality. Some scholars in this area have commented on
the limited framing of "women" within international women's
human rights. This Subpart will give some theoretical cohesion
to a myriad of critiques, with a focus on Janet Halley's Injury
Triad and Third Wave feminist theory.
CEDAW relies on the depiction of women as the victimsubject. Dianne Otto articulates this critique most adroitly with
her three17 "female subjectivities" that frame women as
"others,'2
which this Article addressed in Part I. These
constructions of women's subjectivities reflect a pre-third wave
feminist perspective that ignores the centrality of agency to
contemporary understandings of gender.218 Otto ultimately
concludes that to dismantle the hierarchical binary of gender,
gender must be reconceived as fluid and formulated as a
hybrid. 219 Otto draws the curtain on women's identity to reveal
its complexity. The basis for these subjectivities, I argue, is the
identitarian choice of "women" as the centerpiece of
international law on sex and gender.
Otto's work draws on cultural critiques and intersectional
realities of CEDAW's framing of women. Positing that women
are victims relies on the currency of essentialist notions of both
sex and culture in the international women's human rights
arena. 220 This essentialist understanding presumes a coherent
group identity even among different cultures and overlooks
multi-layered experiences that take into account perspectives of

217Otto, supra note 16, at 106.
218 See generally Crawford, supra note 82; Engle, supra note 15; Ratna
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native"
Subject in International/Post-ColonialFeminist Legal Politics, 15 HARv. HUM.
RTS. J. I, 2 (2002) (discussing the extent to which victim narratives encase
women in restrictive understandings of their position in society).
219Otto,

supra note 16, at 106.

120 Kapur, supra note 218, at 2. Essentialism is the fixing of certain
attributes to women that are assumed to be shared by all of them. Id. at 7.
Experiences of gender oppression cannot be extricated from experiences of racial
oppression because they simultaneously occur. Id. at 8.
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class, race, religion, ethnicity and/or sexual orientation. 22' The
universalist "women" serves to reinforce the depiction of women
in developing countries as perpetually marginalized, 222 an issue
that Lama Abu Odeh has targeted. She notes that a crime of
"passion" bears far more similarities to "honor" killings than
Westerners care to admit.223 The creation and reinforcement of a
victim-subject has not empowered women and may be a setback
to the broader recognition of women's human rights. 224 Kapur
proposes recognition of the intersectionality of gender and the
multiplicity of historically and culturally contingent identities. 225
The dispute around female

226
genital cutting (FGC),

alongside the realities of widespread violence against women,
led to an increasing emphasis on violence as a new, less
controversial universalist discourse. CEDAW does not reference
violence against women, so I will not linger on this point, but it
is worth noting that CEDAW's universalist tendencies continue
221 Id.
222

Culturc has been used as a way to explain the different violence against

women in the post-colonial Third World. Kapur, supra note 219, at 13. But
cultural explanations reproduce the native subject of colonial discourse. Cultural
explanations neither challenge nor take control of the problem and they deflect
attention from the broader and more prevalent crime of domestic violence and
the other reasons that women are abused or killed. Instead of cultural
explanations, there is a need for economic, social, and institutional analysis in
order to create better strategies. Id. at 16.
223 Abu Odeh uses a comparative method to critique "the

legally

sanctioned violence against women (for intimate or sexual reasons), of both the
Arab legal system and that of the American, which," she argues, "reveals the
fallacy of both the orientalist construction that the East is different from the
West." Odeh, supra note 99. Odeh further exposes the "deep similarities between
the internal tensions within each legal system as to what constitutes a killing of
women that is legally tolerated (either fully or partially), and that these tensions,
although sometimes defined differently, have been surprisingly resolved in the
same way." In the international arena, the victim subject may foster racist
perceptions of non-Western women. The victim subject disempowers women,
encouraging nation states to take on protectionist roles and morally regulate
women. Kapur, supra note 218 at 5-6.
224Id. at 36.
22 5

Id.

226See

supra notes 85 and 120.
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to drive other conversations about international women's human
rights.227 This agenda in some ways reifies cultural and religious
presumptions, both of non-Western cultures as primitive and 2of
28
non-Western women as needing to be saved by outsiders.
Viewing these women as victims creates an opposition to the
Western subject. 229 This construction of the victim-subject risks
denying women the agency that they demonstrate throughout
their lives, 230 and reinforces imperialist responses towards

227 Kapur notes, as others have, that such feminist interventions echo
"imperial intervention in the lives of 'backward' native subjects." KAPUR, supra
note 136, at 2. Violence served as the centerpiece of the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women of Belem do Pard, uniting countries with disparate norms around this
goal.
228 Id. This has reinforced the representation of Third World women as
disempowered, brutalized, and victimized. The image of the Third World woman
is reminiscent of the colonial construction of the Eastern woman who is sexually
constrained, tradition-bound, incarcerated in the home, illiterate and poor. Id.
229

Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women s Rights in the 'War on Terrorism', 9

DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 211, 219-20 (2002). For another thought-provoking

take on the Western victimization of women, see Hilary Charlesworth &
Christine Chinkin, Sex, Gender and September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 600
(2002). Charlesworth and Chinkin note that the major players of the 9/Il attacks,
including the terrorists, White House leaders and the majority of firemen and
policemen in New York City, were men. Id. at 600-01. Women were, by and
large, portrayed as victim by the media-widows of 9/11 victims, victims
themselves, and subjects of Afghani male oppression. Id. at 601-04.
230 KAPUR,

supra note 136, at 2.
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women in the developing world. 231Violence against women thus
serves as a site for an alliance between Western and non-Western
feminists, each of which use the construction for legitimizing
their goals in their pursuit of the recognition of human rights. 232
We can understand the preeminence of victimhood in the
construction of women's rights better by reconsidering what
Janet Halley calls the Injury Triad. Women are not innocent in
the construction of a sex-based hierarchy. The Injury Triad,
Halley tells us, is "female injury + female innocence + male
immunity. 2 33 This combination of a self-perception of
constitutional innocence with a presumption of guilt on men's
part leads to presumptions about what the state should do to
"protect" women from men.
The anti-violence agenda and the emphasis on the victimsubject both prove the accuracy of Otto's enunciation of
international law's female subjectivities. Women require agency,
not just protection. Karen Engle stands out as a pioneer in
rethinking international women's human rights with their agency

231 Id. at 17; Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A
Critique of U.S. Feminist Legal Scholarship, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189
(1993) (critiquing an approach that describes women as an oppressed category
and assumes the existence of a "transnational community of 'women' as victims
of, and resistors against, male oppression"). Vasuki argues that universalizing
women's oppression and its imprecise characterization of women's lives does not
attend to the "global contradictions" in women's lives all over the world. Id. at
192. By way of illustration, she contends that American feminist's victimcentered narrative in the context of women working in Sri Lankan factories
operated by transnational corporations ignores the "multiplicity of social
relations that situate women's lives along axes such as gender, class, race and
sexual orientation." Id. at 192. More specifically, American feminists have not
accounted for the effects wage labor has had on liberating some women from the
traditionally gender agrarian economy. Id. at 207. Nesiah does not underestimate
the harsh treatment women face in these factories but wants to give proper
recognition to the greater independence these workers have living in hostels on
the periphery of free trade zones. Id. Complexities like these are left unexamined
by approaches that homogenize the experiences of first and third world women.
Id. at 210.

232Id. at 29.
233SPLIT DECISIONS,

supra note 17, at 324.
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in mind. 234 Agency would require a shift from, not toward, state
paternalism, exemplified by the once widespread restrictions on
women working at night 235 or restrictions on women's
movement without male guardians. 236 Third Wave Feminist
theory has explored how feminism must champion women's

234 Karen Engle's work on criticizing the presumption that the private is
harmful to women is critical here - she first enunciated, within an international
context, the ways in which women may benefit from certain constructions of the
"private." See generally Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private
Distinction: Strategizing Womens Rights, ini RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).

235Article L.213-1 of the French Labor Code banned women's working at
night in any night work of almost any nature. See PROMOTING HEALTH FOR
WORKING WOMEN 65 (Athena Linos & Wilhelm Kirch cds., 2008). The
European Community Directive 76/207 of February 9, 1976 sets forth a general
principle of equal treatment for men and women workers with respect to working
conditions. Directive 76/207, of the European Parliament and Council of 9
February 1976 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for
Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Training and Promotion,
and Working Conditions 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 039) 40-42.
The European Court of Justice overruled this French law and condemned
the French Government for failing to eliminate this rule from its labor laws.
Eventually, the French government adapted its laws to comply with European
Community Law. See France's Labor Code, EQUALITY Now, http://
www.equalitynow.org/cnglish/ wan/beijing5/bcijing5 cconomic en.html (last
visited June 19, 2011). French and European court cases illustrate the limited
policy shift in individual rights as a result of the Europeanization of gender
rights. In a domestic case, decided in La Rochelle, a police court ruled that
Article L.213-1 violated the European Equal Treatment Directive (ETD). See
MARIA GREEN COWLES ET AL., TRANSFORMING EUROPE: EUROPEANIZATION AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE 35 (2001). On the other hand, the case of Levy, ruled on by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), acknowledged that while the French Labor
Code had to comply with the ETD, an exception existed because the code
implemented a prior international agreement. See id.
at 35-36. See also PAUL P.
CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BIRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 919, 926
(2007) (illustrating the limited policy transition through ECJ cases).
236 Rcnu Mandhane, The Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure
Women 's Interests: Critical Analysis of the Implications, 10 MICH J. GENDER &
L. 275 (2004).
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agency to remain relevant. 237 Such theories have explored how
women can choose to occupy subject positions in which they not
only may use sexual power to alter sex-power dynamics, but
also may proactively choose to engage in sexuality viewed as
retrograde by second-wave feminists, such as a "woman's right
3s

to be spanked.'1

This critique also requires upending earlier presumptions
about sexual agency and subjugation. CEDAW's reference to
prostitution is the perfect example of how CEDAW divests
women of agency and creates a victim-subject. The CEDAW
provision calling for the "suppression ...

of the exploitation of

prostitution of women" exemplifies the victimization of females
in the document. 239 By not acknowledging women's "right" to
work as prostitutes, CEDAW characterizes "all prostitution as
'exploitation,"' and all sex workers as apparently in need of
protection from those who exploit them. 240
A related element is women's role as perpetrator of sex
discrimination. Women are not simply, always, and irreducibly
victims. Again, think of FGC, much of which is committed by
women on their daughters. Think of mothers arranging
daughter's marriages or their plastic surgery to prepare them for
the marriage market. In these and many more subtle ways, in
domains public and private, women are complicit in our world
237

Third-Wave Feminism may be defined gcnerationally as the brand of

feminism created by those who developed their political conscience in the 1980s
and 1990s but also thematically as a movement characterized by: (I)
dissatisfaction with earlier feminists; (2) the multiple nature of personal identity;
(3) the joy of embracing traditional feminine appearance and attributes; (4) the
centrality of sexual pleasure and sexual self-awareness; (5) the obstacles to
economic empowerment; and (6) the social and cultural impact of media and
technology." Crawford, supra note 82.
238 Ummni Khan, A Woman s Right to be Spanked:

Testing the Limits of

Tolerance of SIM in the Socio-Legal Imaginary, 18 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 79

(2008).
23 Otto, supra note 16, at 118-19.

240 Id. at 119. See also Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir &
Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in
ContemporaryGovernanceFeminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335 (2006).
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of sex and gender inequality. CEDAW's focus on women
presumes women's innocence in the perpetuation of sex
inequality, when of course the reality of subjugation is far more
241
complex.
One final explanation for how CEDAW's portrait of
women limits their agency is to think about the complexity of
gender identity. Carl Jung argued that every human mind has
elements of "rational, logical capacities," reflecting the male and
"an intuitive, feeling side which functions most often on an
unstructured, subconscious level," reflecting the female. These
elements reflect masculine and feminine aspects of each
individual. 242 Constructing "women" as a unitary sex made up of
victims fails to account for blurriness between male and female
modes of thinking, and a parallel complexity between
perpetrators and victims. Thinking about Jung reminds us of the
fallacy of the sex binary, as exposed by some transgender work.
B. Trans-ing International Law
As Part I conveys, CEDAW's reliance on "women"
supports the construction of humanity as a binary of two sexes.
However, one's gender identity may defy simple categorization
due to biology-there are many biological factors that constitute

241Adrienne Davis has eloquently explored the complexity of such actions
as she examines the erotics of subjugation. Adrienne Dale Davis, But It Feels So
Good to Be Bad." Abjection, Power, & Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara
Walkers) Art and (Janet Halleys) Law, YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming
2011). These complex understandings of the self, as reflected in Freud's work on
masochism, reveals that in a sense, CEDAW's focus on women presumes the
women are rational selves who would not knowingly engage in the perpetuation
of female suffering.
242 Sam Joyner, A Planetary Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence: If Men
Are From Mars and Women Are From Vents, Where Do Lawyers Come From?,
33 TULSA L.J. 1019, 1021 (1998); see also CARL G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL
TYPES (197 1).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

"sex" 243 -- or by intent to change one's identity. 244 Some would
245
even argue that there are as many genders as there are people.

Beyond the blurred divide between "men" and
"women,'c 46 and the reality that sex exists on a continuum, 247
both transgender rights advocates and intersex advocates point to
the need for legal recognition of the multiplicity of gender

243See Trapped, supra note 119, at 504; see e.g., Ehrcnreich & Barr, supra
note 120. In the mid-1990s the modem intersex rights movement began to form.
See Whats the History Behind the Intersex Movement, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF
NORTH AMERICA, http://www.isna.org/faq/history (last visited May 29, 2011).
Taking inspiration from the successes of feminists and gay rights activists, the
intersex movement sought similar reforms and an open discussion of the issues
that intersex people confront in a world where gender identity exists as a binary.
Id. A central concern of the movement is its effort to transform the method of
treatment for babies born interscx. Id. Intersex comes in a multitude of shapes
and forms, both visible and non-visible, but throughout the twentieth century, the
treatment and surgical techniques were devised with the goal of maintaining a
world with two separate sexes-male and female. Id. The medicalization of the
intcrsex condition made it easy for parents and doctors to avoid grappling with
the much more challenging issue of the child's gender identity. Id. Today, the
movement calls on doctors and parents to deal with the health concerns that
some intersex babies face at birth while postponing 'genital normalizing' surgery
until the patient is older. This allows patients to consent before performing a
surgery that may be at odds with their gender identity. Id. The movement wants
people to be aware of and understand the intersex condition so that society stops
trying to "make it disappear" and instead starts trying to ensure that these
individuals may live prosperous lives with a stable gender identity. Id.
244 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 121 and accompanying text.

245See STOLTENBERG, supra note 124, at 28. The failure to recognize this
diversity is a particular failing of this culture. Cultures from Ancient Greece to
India, as well as various others around the world, recognized the existence of
hermaphrodite, or inter-sex, individuals and cross-gender identified individuals
without forcing them into either of the male or female genders. See LESLIE
FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS 39-47 (1996).
246AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 122 and accompanying

text.
247See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 125.
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identity. 248 Transgender rights advocates assert an absolute right

to gender identity, in which individuals can choose an identity
that reflects that individual's understanding of self, including
gender identity. 249
The focus on "women" in CEDAW leaves transgender
individuals in the difficult position of questionable international
law subjectivity. As with all juridical constructs, the sex binary
legitimizes certain acts and identities while delegitimizing
others. CEDAW's exclusion of multiple sexes has serious
consequences. Transgender individuals lack the social position
ascribed to "men" in the sex binary and lack recourse to the
remedies promulgated for "women" by CEDAW. Intersex people
face the violence of having their bodies surgically transformed at
birth to conform them to one sex or the other. 250 CEDAW's
adherence to the gender binarism perpetuates this violence by
ascribing legal importance to .one's sex, when that identity
should be left to the individual to determine. It seems strange to
think that a transgender individual, born as a man who becomes
a woman (whether by virtue of surgery or even just self-identity)
suddenly also is transformed into the bearer of rights under
CEDAW. Equally strange is the reality that a woman who
becomes a man loses that set of rights. Finally, it is worth
remembering that there are many people with mixed sex traits,
248 In August of 1992, the International Conference on Transgendcr Law
and Employment Policy (ICTLEP) set out to draft a "Gender Bill of Rights."
Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights, in
TRANSGENDER LAW 327 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price

Minter eds., 2006). The following August, the Conference presented a first draft
that they proceeded to revise and amend at three subsequent annual meetings. Id.
The product purports to enumerate a set of universal civil and human rights that,
if honored, will to all persons' gender identity without regard to "chromosomal
sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role." Id. On its own the Bill is
without the force of law, -recently however, local governments peppered across
the United States have begun to recognize some of the rights as have foreign
governments including Canada, South Africa, Australia, Great Britain, and other
Western European countries.
249Id.
250 The drama of intersex individuals is most humanly depicted in the
recent novel Middlesex, in which the main character acquires secondary traits in
puberty that reveal her mixed-sex identity. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX
(2003).
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such as South African runner Caster Semenya, who was the
subject of a humiliating debate as to whether she is the bearer of
rights. In short, CEDAW's insistence on "women" creates a
farce, a tragic one for many, in a world full of many sexes and
genders.
As transnational law advocates push for thinking about
international law in more complex ways, CEDAW should be
"trans-ed,"25' which is to say that it should no longer reflect a
sex binary to the exclusion of other genders. I recognize that
many transgender rights efforts simply attempt to establish rights
by extending an identitarian formulation to transgender
individuals, through which individuals would be protected for
their choice of sex. Many within transgender movements assert
that the entire gender binarism should be upended to expose the
multiplicity of sexes and genders not only in society, but also
within each of us. To say that international law should be transed means that it should include all sexes, even those who fall
251 Transnational law is distinct from international law. Internationallaw
reflects agreements and responsibilities between states, whereas transnational
law reflects a broader set of legal interactions, involving states, non-state actors
and the interaction between domestic legal structures and international ones; it
reflects a cosmopolitan goal of fostering interactions and even harmonization
among legal systems. Transnational law represents a hybrid of domestic and
international law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why TransnationalLaw Matters, 24
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745, 745 (2006). In 1956, Judge Philip Jessup famously
defined transnational law in his Storrs Lectures at Yale as "all law which
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers ...[including] [b]oth
public and private international law... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit
into such standard categories." Id.(quoting PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1956)). While the definition is still applicable today, Harold Koh has
expounded on the term in his analyses on transnational legal process. According
to Koh, transnational law encompasses all laws that are not purely domestic or
purely international law. See id. His operational definition consists of: (I) laws
that are "downloaded" from international to domestic law; (2) laws that are
"uploaded" from domestic to international law, then "downloaded" back to
domestic law; and (3) laws that arc borrowed or "horizontally transplanted" from
one national system to another. See id. at 745-46. Not surprisingly, transnational
law has become increasingly significant to our lives given the globalized nature
of law and legal studies. Id. at 746. This prominence is reflected in transnational
legal process, in which public and private actors, including nation states,
corporations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
individuals, interact in a variety of fora to interpret, enforce, and ultimately
internalize, rules of international law. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996). The key elements of this
approach are interaction, interpretation and internalization. Id.
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outside of the sex binary. Numerically, however, the largest sex
identity excluded by CEDAW is men..
C. Include Men
CEDAW should reference all sexes. And if CEDAW's
focus on women is mistaken, a large part of its error is the
exclusion of men. During the 1989 bicentennial of France's
Declaration of the Rights of Man, feminists questioned the
textual exclusion from the Declaration of women by covering
posters around France with the words "and woman." As we
should unsex the universal "man" in the "the rights of man," it is
equally appropriate to question the focus on women when
gender inequality afflicts people of all genders. 252 Although men
benefit in terms of wealth and power from their "insider" status,
men also suffer from gender inequality by the constraints of
rigid gender normativity. 25 3 To eliminate discrimination against
women, men must be included in the central defining language
alongside women so that the design and implementation of
remedies reflects the fuller nature of sex discrimination. Men
must be allies in a battle on gender inequality; without men,
broader goals for gender equality will remain unrealized. 254 This
Subpart will first describe the presence of men in CEDAW, and
then address how men are also victims, in part due to
masculinity's harm to men. Finally this Subpart will consider the
essential contributions men can bring to gender equality efforts.
1. Men in CEDAW
Men are a part of CEDAW: as the yardstick for equality, as
252 Here 1 build on two works regarding men's relationship to feminism.
Nancy Levit, Feminism For Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of
Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037, 1038 (1996); PAUL NATHANSON &

KATHERINE K. YOUNG, LEGALIZING MISANDRY:
SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEN (2006).

FROM PUBLIC SHAME TO

253An example of this, discussed at Part 111.C.2. infra, is parental leave.
Societal norms suggest to men that they are inferior to women in family care
giving, and belong in the workforce while women stay home to care for children.
This plays out in states that allow for more parental leave for women after
childbirth than for men.
254See ihji,a Part I11.C.3.
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the implicit perpetrator of discrimination and as the potential
protector in the form of the state. Given CEDAW's focus on
equality, men largely serve as a reference point for the ideal of
equality between men and women. Article 1 defines equality
between men and women as a basis for its antidiscrimination
norms. 255 Article 7 guarantees access to participate in political
life "on equal terms with men. 2 56 Article 8 uses the same
language. 257 Article 9 guarantees women "equal rights with
men" to self-determination over nationality. 258 The language of
Article 10 typifies CEDAW's use of language: "States Parties
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men
in the field of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women .. .259 Men here serve as a
benchmark, as CEDAW establishes "equal rights with men" and
"on a basis of equality of men and women" as a measurement of
its success. The core, formal equality sections of CEDAW urge
states to promote women's progress with men as the
comparator. 260 CEDAW's language reminds one of "Men are
from Mars, Women are from Venus,"-a portrait of stark
differences. 261 CEDAW's emphasis on women, to the exclusion
of men, reifies the gendered nature of power, leaving men out of
the equation both as a subject of analysis and as a subject of
rights, except insofar as their socio-economic position can
measure law's (and, since CEDAW is the law, "women's")
success at combating sexism.
Second, if women are the victims of discrimination,
implicitly there is a perpetrator of this discrimination. Paul
Nathanson and Katherine Young argue that ideological
255See CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. 1.
256.Id. art. 7.
257Id. art. 8.
258Id. art. 9.
259

Id. art. 10.

260Otto, supranote 16.
261JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (1992).
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feminist 2 62 efforts have succeeded in replacing a male-dominated
legal structure with one that favors women at men's expense,
replacing discrimination against women with a legislated double
standard against men. 263 They describe this force as misandry,

"the idea that men can be classified only as evil or inadequate, or
as honorary women."'264 In this gynocentric worldview, women's
membership in a victim class situates men as "collectively
guilty. 2 65 CEDAW's silent reference to men as the perpetrator
262 As Nathanson and Young use the term, "ideological feminism" means
the dualistic world-view that characterizes woman as victims and men as
oppressors. The authors also list the following as characteristic features of
ideological feminism: essentialism-the emphasis on the unique qualities of
women; hierarchy-indirect or direct suggestion that women are superior to
men; collectivism-the communal goals of women outweigh the rights of
individual men; utopianism-establishing an ideal social order in history;
selective cynicism-systematic suspicion directed only toward men;
revolutionism-political agenda that supersedes reform; consequentialism-the
idea that the ends justify the means; and quasi-religiosity-a secular religion
created. NATHANSON & YOUNG, supra note 253.
263 Id. at 264. Nathanson and Young state that "[d]iscrimination against
men is by now so pervasively institutionalized that it is best described as
systemic and characteristic of the' legal system as a whole. Id. Nathanson and
Young argue that the legal system, through the participation of the media, has
fostered a radical shift in the perception of men. The authors argue that the media
has placed men on public trial by its coverage of heinous male-on-female violent
crimes, of sexual harassment cases, and of male-child sexual abuse cases. In
discussing public incidents of male sexual violence, Nathanson and Young argue
that the accused in each case were portrayed to represent the entire class of men
and that even where courts had decided otherwise, the verdict against these men
-against all men-was guilty. Id. at 315. For these authors, CEDAW, as well as
the Beijing Platform for Action and a special annex to the Declaration and the
Platform most clearly exemplify legalized misandry. Nathanson and Young point
to the elision of human rights into women's rights. Id. at 393-94. Interestingly,
the authors point to the dominance of Western feminists as a key factor in the
support for these ideological feminist assertions. Nathanson and Young also note
the lack of participation in the debate by non-Westem delegates. The authors
suggest that these non-Western feminists view Westem ideological feminism as
the "newest form of Western imperialism." Id. at 395. They take the argument
further, writing that ideological feminism is a secular religion, functioning as a
rival to traditional religions. As Nathanson and Young see it, one of the
ideological feminists' ultimate goals is to eliminate all traditional religions,
which would also lead to disappearance of the cultures associated with those
religions. Id. at 395.
264

ld.at xiii.
Id. at xi.
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of discrimination does imply their guilt. The presumption of
men's responsibility has real consequences in blinding the
impact of sex discrimination on men, but I disagree with
Nathanson and Young over the power of women's rights to
determine international law outcomes. Even if international
law's women's identitarianism is objectionable, its principal
effect is not to subjugate men (as they argue), but rather to
weaken the impact of women's rights and other equality efforts,
as Lara Stemple has demonstrated with her work on HIV
prevention campaigns that erroneously focus solely on
266
women.
In thinking about men as perpetrators and not victims of
sex discrimination, prior drafts of CEDAW reflect tension over
how men are referenced. For example, in the debate over the
Preamble, the World Health Organization (WHO) suggested that
the "human dignity" of men should be emphasized as well as
that of women. 267 The final wording does not reflect this
suggestion. One debate over Article I I on employment
discrimination reflects the tone of the considerations of
CEDAW's language. The United States, which it should be
noted again has not ratified the Convention, proposed a change
in the language to note that "existing laws on health and safety,
though originally designed for the protection of women, in
practice often prevented women from getting better or higher
paid jobs." 268 The Soviet Union disagreed. It argued that since
the Convention sought to eliminate discrimination against
women, "references to men, who--so far as [the representative
was aware]-were not particularly disadvantaged in the matter
of employment, were therefore out of place.

' 269

Ultimately, the

language adopted does not reference men.
Third, men also play a role since nearly all CEDAW
266Dean

Peacock, Lara Stemplc, Sharif Sawircs & Thomas Coates, Men,

HIVIAIDS, and Human Rights, 51 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME

119(2009).
267REHOF,

266i.
2 9

6

Id.

supra note 86, at 34.

at 137.
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signatories are led by men. As I have explored extensively in
other work, men play a dominant role in political positions in
most countries in the world, with the exception of some
Scandinavian countries and Rwanda. To the extent CEDAW
references a state, it is implicitly a male-run state.
These debates over the drafting of CEDAW reflect several
truths about the Convention. First, they confirm the presumption
of the binarist nature of sex by the parties to the Convention.
Second, the Soviet Union's reference to men reflects a
presumption that men do not suffer from sexism and that only
women are victims of employment discrimination. However,
debate over Article 5 reflects that some parties to the Convention
were aware of the possibility that men may be victims of sexbased discrimination. Sweden proposed that the language related
to "the elimination of prejudices based on ideas of inferiority
and superiority" be altered to reference the "inferiority or
superiority of either sex. ' 270 Sweden's intervention on behalf of
language that references "either sex" marks the potential that
existed for the Convention. It too supports the understanding that
the Parties presumed the existence of two distinct sexes.
One element of CEDAW stands out from this obsessively
identitarian text. Article 5(a) appears to reference men toward a
different end-"'[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women'.1 271 Article 5(a) seeks to shift
men's and women's cultural patterns that lead to the dominance
of one sex by another based on stereotyped roles for men and
women. 272 Article 5(a) uniquely references both men and
women, and focuses on battling stereotypes. In this sense, it
serves both as a substantive provision and as a lens through
which to interpret the balance of CEDAW's substantive

270Id. at

80.

271 Elizabeth Scpper, C'onfroting the "Sacred and Unchangeable ": The
Obligation to Modify Cultural Patterns Under the Women s Discrimination

Treaty, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L. L. 585 (2008).
272 Andrca Vcsa, international and Regional Standards For Protecting
ictims of Domestic Violence, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 328

(2004).
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provisions. 273 Article 5(a) incorporates the Convention's
aspirational norms into all other sections, as interpreted by the
CEDAW Committee. 274
This Section plays an important role: "Article 5(a)'s first
role is as an interpretive tool, that is, as a standard by which to
measure compliance with the more substantive articles of
CEDAW. 2 75 It recognizes that men and women play a role in
the practices that perpetuate gender discrimination. Thus, in
Article 5(a), the drafters of CEDAW seemed to have expanded
the scope of the treaty language to include practices by both
genders. The utility of the Article is to provide the opportunity
for the identification of broader cultural practices that hamper
gender equality.2 76 Some suggest that Article 5(a) has begun to
acquire more interpretive force within the CEDAW Committee,
and to permit the Committee to voice its concerns with regard to
men and women as well as to social stereotypes.

273Sepper, supra note 272, at 596.
274Id. at

60 1.

275 Id. at 597 (assessing the CEDAW Committee's comments and
recommendations to ascertain the meaning of Article 5(a), particularly in the
context of Western countries).
276 Id. at 598. For example, as Elizabeth Sepper notes: "If there is an
overarching theme to the Committee's questioning it is probably Article 5's
obligation to take steps to discourage stereotyped attitudes about the roles of men
and women .... lt has been extremely critical of general policy statements or
particular social arrangements which give primacy to motherhood, to the neglect
of women's other roles and of men's responsibilities as fathers." Id. at 613. In
response to the Committee's Article 5(a) admonitions, states have restructured
parental leave policies to give father's greater access to child rearing and mothers
to the workplace. Id. at 624 (2008). Liechtenstein enacted a policy that "involved
a four-day program in which high school-age boys and girls 'engaged in a
consistent exchange of roles where 'the girls did craftmen's work and technical
tasks, while the boys worked in social and domestic areas'." Id. at 625. When it
comes to realizing the aspirations of Article 5(a), gender matters. To undo social
stereotypes, states must undo them for both men and women. Indeed, in the
United States, to the extent that female.equality was advanced through the equal
protection clause, most of those cases were brought by men. Similarly, this
article offers evidence of how, through Article 5(a), the Committee has advanced
women's rights through deconstructing the entrenched "gendered stereotypes"
that limit both sexes. Id. at 638.
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CEDAW's problem is that the reference to men in Article
5(a) is an isolated one, suggesting that the drafters chose to
include men in this one section, but not elsewhere, thus
assuaging countries that advocated for a Convention whose title
and substance would directly reference equality between men
and women.2 77 The exclusion of "men" elsewhere raises the
question of whether it was consistent to include them in this one
section. Seeking solutions involving only women fails to
account for the complex issues that go well beyond group
identity-issues that deal with the fundamental set of power
relations that define all societies and states in the international
system, in which subordination based on gender constitutes the
norm for political, economic and familial institutions. Given that
CEDAW's reference in Article 5(a) stands as a limited
intervention toward thinking about gender beyond "women," we
can safely conclude that CEDAW is largely silent on how
international law should govern gender issues as they relate to
men, except insofar as it seeks to limit men's dominance in
public power.
CEDAW's flawed discussion of men is echoed in
subsequent international efforts that reflect an even deeper
ambivalence toward the recognition of male suffering from
gender imbalances. Other international law dealing with gender
questions largely follows CEDAW's lead in shunting men's
issues to the side, including rape-related interventions into

277CEDAW, supra

note 3, at art. 5(a).
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international criminal law 278 and gender mainstreaming efforts.
2.

Masculinity's Harm to Men

If CEDAW reflects the vision that presumes women are
victims of discrimination, it equally supposes that men benefit

278 Recent

feminist international interventions place men's issues as

secondary to women's issues. For example, with regard to the categorization of
rape as a war crime, Janet Halley has argued that these efforts represented not a
middle ground between conservative and leftist feminist ideologies but rather a
firmly structuralist approach that conceived international criminal law in terms
of male domination and female subordination. See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note
17,at 3. One consequence for men was the attempt to remove consent as a
defense to rape charges. Halley recognizes some value in the recognition of rape
as a war crime in certain contexts, but questions whether the intervention was a
salutary one. Her critique centers of the use of criminalization as a tool of gender
normativity. Id. at 4. For example, feminist negotiators did not settle for the
Geneva Convention's classification of rape as a crime against humanity: they
"did not want women's physical integrity to be a subset of universal human
integrity." Id. at 67. Instead, they believed that a woman's right to be free from
sexual assault was "universal in scope," and that this right should not be shared
with men, but established as a separate protection. Id. at 167. They argued that
sexual assault should sit alongside the worst international criminal law violations
of crimes against humanity and genocide. Id. at 123 (citing Samantha I. Ryan,
From the Furies of Nanking to the Eumenides of the International Criminal
Court: The Evolution of Sexual Assaults as International Crime, I I PACE INT'L
L. R-v. 447, 450 (1999)). The Rome statute adopted this idea: persecution based
on gender, including rape, is a crime against humanity. One advocate conveys
this idea: "every rape is an expression of male domination and female
subordination and thus a persecution on the basis of gender." Id. (quoting
Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women
in Times of War, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIAHERZGOVINIA 212-13 (Alexandra Stiglmaycr ed., Marion Faber trans., 1994).
Halley vehemently disagrees with these attempts to frame an armed conflict like
the war in the Balkans as a "war-against-women." Id. These feminist advocates
attempted, but failed, to include gender violence, including the gendercd social
constructs that support male dominance, in the list of sexual offenses. See SPLIT
DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 83. This reform was yet another effort to regulate
everyday sexism even when not related to armed conflict. Id. at 84.
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from inequality-and in certain material senses, they do. 2 79 Yet,
men too suffer from gender inequality, including heightened
workplace danger, reduced life spans and reduced family and
leisure time.280 In certain vocations, men are exposed to danger
by being placed on the frontlines in battle or underground in
mines. 281 Moreover, men are increasingly less educated than
women throughout developed economies.
It is beyond the scope of this Article
range of harms to men that occur due
inequality and stereotyping. However, a
social science literature reveal some of the
suffer real harms because they are men.

to catalogue the full
to sex and gender
few examples from
extent to which men

First, in the workplace, it is customary to think of women
279

Men, it is widely reported, possess ninety-nine percent of private

property. See e.g., NANCY LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 288 (1995). In

addition, far more leaders are men than women, in both the public and private
sectors, in most countries of the world. My own work has focused on women's
leadership and how quotas may remedy their exclusion from political and
corporate power. See Internalizing Gender, supra note 8, at 787-99 (analyzing
how CEDAW has influenced Brazil and France in establishing quotas for
women's political representation); Loving Gender Balance, supra note 207, at
2873, 2885 (arguing that Norway's Corporate Board quota, which sets a forty
percent floor for both sexes, works not only by promoting women but also by
protecting men from becoming voiceless in leadership); Feminizing Capital,
supra note 180 (asserting that Norway's Corporate Board quota fosters a
productive symbiosis between the public and private spheres); Parity/Disparity,
supra note 27 (examining Brazil and France's parity laws and the role they play
in constructing and sustaining subordination among identity or interest groups).
250 See Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and
Medical Leave Act Perpetuates Sex Inequality Across All Levels, 16 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 429, 430 (2007) (addressing the difficulty dads in America face as
they attempt to strike a balance between their work and their families); Nancy
Gibbs, Viewpoint: Bring on the Daddy Wars, TIME, Feb. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1168125,00.html (reporting on
the need for greater recognition of the plight of fathers in the national work
family debate).
281

See e.g.,

BUREAU OF

LABOR

STATISTICS,

CENSUS OF

FATAL

OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS AND
SELECTED EVENT OR EXPOSURE, 2007, available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/cfoi.tO4.htm [hereinafter CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES] (Showing that men account for ninety-two percent of occupational

fatalities).
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as the primary, even the sole, victims of discrimination. Indeed,
given the extent to which women receive lower compensation
for many jobs and less frequently obtain leadership positions,
one can understand this focus. CEDAW's text reflects this
understanding, stating that "States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, the same rights. '28 2 Men
consistently take on riskier employment. Men work in the most
dangerous positions, resulting in ninety-three percent of all fatal
occupational injuries compared to just seven percent for
women. 283 Much of the pay gap between men and women hinges
on the fact that men take more dangerous jobs, as those working
in hazardous industries receive higher compensation. 284 Child
labor has a gender disparity as well-while female youth were
nearly as likely as male youth to be working, the work
performed by male youth was twice as likely to be illegal work,
often in dangerous industries (particularly construction) with

282

See CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. II.

213 See e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 281. Women tend
to choose work in safer industries than men, perhaps because of differences in
preferences, or even employer discrimination. See Thomas DeLiere & Helen
Levy, Worker Sorting and the Risk of Death on the Job, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 925,
926 (2004). Family structures seem to play a dominant role in the choice of a
high-risk job. Single parents are the most averse to high-risk occupations. Id.
Women's contributions to child rearing are often viewed as more difficult to
replace than men's contributions. Id. Other studies argue that women select
themselves into more secure jobs and the effects on the gender wage gap. See
Jochen Kluve & Sandra Schaffner, Gender Wage Differentials and the

OccupationalInjury Risk, 28 RUHR ECON. PAPERS 1,4 (2007).
84

2

Id.at 21.
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285
excessive hours.

in short, CEDAW's focus on employment discrimination
mistakenly frames the problem as one solely affecting women,
when the harms are distributed disproportionately by sex, to
generalize in employment, with higher pay and greater danger
for men and lower pay and less danger for women. CEDAW's
focus on guaranteeing women's rights by "ensur[ing] on a basis
of equality of men and women, the same rights 28 6 overlooks the
extent to which a solution depends on shifting sex distribution in
work.
Like employment, education inequality is far more
complicated than CEDAW presents. Article 10 states: "States
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal
rights with men in the field of education and in particular to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women. 28 7 In the
United States, for example, one female graduated college for
every 1.60 males in 1960, a statistic that almost flipped by 2003

285 Douglas Kruse, Illegal Child Labor in the United States: Prevalence
and Characteristics, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 17, 27 (2000). Likewise, most
of the many child soldiers deployed throughout the world arc boys. In a separate
vein, Halley argues that feminist advocates' reasoning for objecting to child
soldiers is that trauma to boys ratifies patriarchal values, and thus harms women.
See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 17, at 85. Feminist Universalism (FU) does not
recognize masculinity in itself as a "site of harm." Id. at 86. Halley explains why
such a concession would be antithetical to the FU vision as it would "ielinquish
not the commitment to seeing domination in sexuality and gender, but the
commitment to seeing that domination as structurally committed to male
domination and female subordination." Id. Halley points out that this reasoning
fosters an indifference to the suffering of men. In this example, men's harms do
not even appear to be secondary to those of women; rather, the pain dealt to child
soldiers is only seen through the pain caused by them on women. Id.

286See CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. 11.
287

Id. art. 10.
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with one male for every 1.35 females. 28 8 The picture is different
in developing and poor countries, in which girls' education lags
behind boys' education. These disparities expose the overly
simple identitarian focus of CEDAW's prescription: bringing
women to men's level in the developing world only led to a
disparity in the other direction. Rather, the focus should be on
seeking equal access without regard to sex or gender, a provision
that might profitably apply to developed, developing and poor
countries. Here, as in the context of employment, a greater focus
on stereotype reduction or elimination would lead to a more
effective legal regime.
Another example surfaces in recent social science literature
as crucial to gender equality efforts: parental leave. CEDAW's
provision here blatantly preferences women's parenting. Article
11 states:
In order to prevent discrimination against
women on the grounds of marriage or
maternity and to ensure their effective right to
work, States Parties shall take appropriate
measures: (a) To prohibit, subject to the
imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave
and discrimination in dismissals on the basis
of marital status; (b) To introduce maternity
leave with pay or with comparable social
benefits without loss of former
employment,
28 9
seniority or social allowances
This text, unlike the text for employment and education, does
288Claudia Goldin et al., The Homecoming of American College Women:
The Reversal of the College Gender Gap, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 133 (2006).
Almost all OECD countries follow this trend. Id. at 154. Part of this dramatic
shift lies in greater preparation for college as women expect higher earnings in a
more open labor market. Id. However, one study also found that non-cognitive
behavioral differences between boys and girls explain almost the entire shift
toward females in higher education, adjusting for family background, test scores,
and high school achievement. Id. at 154. Teenage males' higher likelihood to be
arrested, suspended from school, and placed in special educational programs led
to some of this differential. Id.
289

See CEDAW, supra note 3, at art. II.
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not even reference equality between men and women, but rather
focuses solely on women's parenting. Of course women
uniquely serve the function of childbirth and of breast-feeding,
but beyond those two functions, men are equally capable of
parenting. Here, CEDAW's framing fosters continued
stereotypes of women as caretakers and men as unsuited to
family and caretaking roles. 290 This harmful male stereotype
impairs women as well as men, by acting as an291"impediment to
the equal division of childcare responsibilities.

Even where policies, such as those adopted by the United
States, provide parental leave for parents of either sex, women
are far more likely to take such leave, reflecting one of the
purposes of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 292 Here,
CEDAW's identitarian remedy aggravates inequalities: many
290 These stereotypes come to life in the marketplacc-women can and do
take parental leave more readily than men, and men are often discounted from
receiving custody of their children. Levit, supra note 253, at 1073.
291 Id. at 1074. This is the subject of a subsequent project that focuses on
the need to unsex parenting.

292 Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking
Paternity Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 257, 258 (2003). Although the statute employed gender-neutral language,
men take far less advantage of the parental leave benefits because they assume it
does not apply to them, that society will judge them adversely for taking such
leave and because their eaming expectations require them to forego leave. The
basic premise of the stigma in taking paternity leave is because society views
men as breadwinners and women as caregivers and that "men are less attached to
their children." Id. at 262. Hence, "parenthood remains a highly gendered
concept in our culture." I. at 261. These gender stereotypes attribute to the low
number of male leave takers despite the Act's gender-neutral language. For
newborn child. care "men receive subtle messages from employers that their
place is at the office and their wives' responsibility is child care." i.at 262. In
fact, many law firms require that male employees meet the "primarily carcgiver"
benchmark prior to taking a paid paternity leave. Id. In sum, there is a double
standard because successful, working, women are perceived as bad mothers,
while men are successful fathers only if they are successful at work. Id. at 263.
Halverson lays out five points to explain men's exclusion from FMLA: (I)
paternity leave is still stigmatizing in the workplace, (2) most men cannot afford
to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave, (3) many men do not realize that the
FMLA covers paternity leave, (4) the FMLA places an administrative burden on
employers, hence creating obstacles for men taking FMLA paternity leave, and
(5) the Act was not created to further the cause of fathers who want to bond with
their newborns. Id. at 258.
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economists point out that maternity leave policies, or even sexneutral policies that favor women, lead to the hiring of fewer
women and the reinforcement of sexist norms of work and
income. 293 A sex and gender-neutral model can reflect women's
but still provide for men's
biological realities in child-bearing,
294
equal participation in parenting.
These examples briefly illustrate the potential for a gender
or sex-related international treaty. 295 CEDAW could be a
powerful instrument if it acted as a catalyst for internalizing
international norms that protect both men and women.
3.

Men's Potential Contribution toward Gender

293To the extent that women are more likely to take maternity leave,
employers view them as more expensive employees. In this sense, the
stereotypes reinforce men's financial advantage over women. Their benefit from
this stereotype does not, however, ameliorate the cost of not having time with
their families.
294 Indeed, Scandinavian models reflect the importance of shared
parenting for greater economic equality as well as more evenly shared familial
responsibilities. Michelle Ashamalla, A Swedish Lesson in Parental Leave
Policy, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 241, 243 (1993). Two employed parents are entitled to
a combined eighteen months of parental leave. Either parent may use this benefit
in its entirety or apportion it. To encourage paternal involvement in child rearing,
Sweden has a rule requiring three months of that time allowance to be used by
the father. As such, the Swedish gender-neutral system does not penalize women
who desire both a career and children. Id. Perhaps more remarkable is that
parents have the option to return to work on a part-time basis until the child
reaches the age of eight. Id. As the parental leave example demonstrates, laws
that seek to ameliorate women's situation by focusing on women actually
reinforce gender disparities. Laws that address issues with attention to both men
and women achieve more success in improving women's lives and decreasing
gender disparities.
295 It is worth mentioning one last example, female genital cutting (FGC).
FGC has proven to be one of most critical and divisive issues in the international
women's movement. See Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 120; see also Obiora,
supra note 44. Often overlooked in this debate is the extent to which discussion
of the issue as a women's issue is self-defeating because it leaves men out of the
solution. Here, it is worth noting.the example of the former Egyptian First Lady,
Suzanne Mubarak, who has pursued a public campaign to raise awareness of the
dangers of female genital circumcision, including the importance of convincing
men to accept a wife who has not undergone the procedure. See ELIZABETH
HEGER BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN THE

GLOBAL COMMUNITY 105 (2005). Eliminating the practice involves finding ways
to resist the practice or reduce the harms resulting from the practice.
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Equality
Men do perpetuate gender inequality, but they are by no
means the only actors, nor are women the only victims. Sexism
also oppresses men, and to eliminate discrimination, men must
be included in the design and implementation of remedies.
CEDAW's title and text should utilize language that includes all
genders.
Eliminating inequality based on sex depends at least as
much on freeing men from binding socialization roles as it does
on freeing women. 296 In terms of freeing women, laws that
provide special treatment for women can also serve to trap them
-Justice Brennan described these laws as a "pedestal" that can
act also as a "cage. 2 97 Kathleen Sullivan agrees, pointing out
that "[w]omen's freedom from stereotypes of fragility and
dependence, on this view, requires men's freedom from
stereotypes of aggressor and paterfamilias. Equality functions as
a preference for fluid over fixed identity, which requires
98
disaggregating the biology of sex from the culture of gender."2
This understanding of sex and gender further reveals the limited
vision behind a women-centered treaty.
Within U.S. feminist circles, the most persuasive theorist
296See Sullivan, supra note 168, at 752 (paraphrasing Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg).
297 Id. at 744. For an example of such a "pedestal" in international law,
consider the Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in
Industry, July 9, 1948, 81 U.N.T.S. 147. The convention provided that "[wlomen
without distinction of age shall not be employed during the night in any public or
private industrial undertaking, or in any branch thereof, other than an
undertaking in which only members of the same family are employed." Id., at
art. Il. The International Labor Organization adopted this special protection,
believing that without it women would not be able to perform their domestic
roles as wife and caregiver. Kamala Sankaran, Night Work by Women: How
Should Special Protective Measures for Women be Defined, 9 NEw ENG. J. INT'L

& COMp. L. ANN. 417, 419-20 (2003). Several parties to CEDAW, including
Austria and New Zealand, ratified subject to a reservation permitting them to
exclude women from night work and honor their obligation under the Night
Work Convention. See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.

643, 697-98 (1990).
298 Sullivan, supra note 168, at 752.
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on these issues is Nancy Levit, who articulated a role for men in
feminism in a positive fashion. Legal scholars, largely in an
incidental fashion, have addressed the extent to which men
has omitted
suffer from male stereotypes. Feminist legal theory
299
men "as participants in the reconstructive project.
Exploring how patriarchy harms men, Levit hopes "to
enlist men in the feminist fight against it."'3 0 Legal doctrine
perpetuates harmful stereotypes of men, 30 1 such as the
requirement that they suffer in silence and reserve their
isolates men who suffer
emotions. This silencing of male victims
30 2
from sexual violence and harassment.
The radical feminist method of consciousness-raising,
Levit argues, should be put to use to "test the ways in which
society has relegated men to stereotypically male roles,"
30 3
although the groups should be composed of both genders.
Feminists must pay heed to society's treatment of men:
"stereotyping harms to one gender also rigidify role expectations
of the other gender."3 4 Men should be "invited into the
discourse."30 5 Levit's argument, framed largely in the context of

299 Levit, supra note 253, at 1038. These arguments have played a large
role in public debates over gender equality in Scandinavia, both within feminist
circles and in government policies. See generally SCANDINAVIAN CRITIQUE OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN FEMINIST THEOLOGY (Hanna Stenstrom et al. eds., 2007).

300 Levit, supra note 253, at 1040. After a lengthy survey of several
strands of feminist theory (liberal, cultural, radical and postmodcrn), and how
they have all either vilified or omitted men from their discourses, Levit expresses
her concern that "men have no history as gendered selves" because "no work
describes historical events in terms of what these events meant to the men who
participated in them as men." Within legal theory, there is also a severe dearth of
scholarship exploring legal conceptions of masculinity and how they affect both
genders. Id.
301

Id.

2

30 Id. at 1063.
303
3

Id.

04Id. at 1112.
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the United States, applies to international law directly.
CEDAW's silence about men and apparent ignorance of the
extent to which men suffer from sexism exposes a key blind spot
-CEDAW
cannot succeed in fulfilling its drafters' goals
without men in conversation and on board with the project of
gender equality.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that CEDAW is neither
accurate nor effective. It is not accurate because the real sex and
gender engagements must include men, women who are not
victims, and transgender people. It may also include the panoply
of gender-related issues that surface in the Yogyakarta
Principles. It is also not effective-CEDAW has been effective
at many things, but it has not achieved the broad transformation
promised. It cannot achieve that equality as long as the harms it
addresses focus solely on "women" as a group.
With contemporary understandings of sex, gender and
sexuality serving as the foundation for a new treaty, international
law might come closer to reflecting reality, thereby fostering
greater equality. Putting "sex" or "gender" in the place of
"women" has more than semiotic value. As a category, either
term moves beyond the limits of essentialist notions of
womanhood toward reducing gender inequality and guaranteeing
universal human rights. This radical proposal may strike those
who fought for the enactment of CEDAW and implemented it
over nearly thirty years as apostasy. Yet were they, along with all
others interested in human rights, to redraft the Convention
tabula rasa, they would recognize the primacy of gender as a
fundamental element of progress on these issues.
Although CEDAW has played an important role in certain
contexts regarding such issues, a sex or gender-focused treaty
would reach more deeply into the inequalities that plague
humanity. Today, the Convention and its "women's" approach
serves as the pinnacle of gender-based rights. Underneath it lays
gender mainstreaming efforts and other attempts to reference
gender. Unsexing CEDAW would flip the architecture of
international women's human rights to focus on gender, with
women included under that rights umbrella.
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I realize that it would be a monumental, perhaps
unachievable task to revise such a widely subscribed treaty.
Even so, recognizing its flaws permits thinking about the
importance of moving forward in other ways. Reinterpreting
Article 5(a) as a dominant method of interpreting CEDAW's
Articles could be one way to achieve such progress. Another
would be to focus efforts on the broader adoption of the
Yogyakarta Principles and even the recognition by States Parties
and the CEDAW Committee that the Principles enact a crucial
part of the Convention's goals.
CEDAW's problem is a problem for women's rights as
well. Although such a broad argument is beyond the scope of
this Article, the international women's rights context reflects the
extent to which the focus on women as a group will fail as long
as it ignores the extent to which men are excluded from any
serious consideration. Gender inequalities box us all into a
preordained set of advantages and disadvantages. Unsexing
CEDAW is not just a remedy to a shortcoming in international
law, but a model for thinking about gender issues as a human
rights question for all people.

